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INTRODUCTION
Several of the nation's most influential constitutional law
scholars have been arguing for the better part of a decade that judicial
review should be sharply limited, or eliminated altogether. The list
includes such prominent thinkers as Professor Mark V. Tushnet of
Harvard Law School, Professor Cass R. Sunstein of the University of
Chicago Law School, and Dean Larry D. Kramer of Stanford Law
School. In place of the doctrine made famous by Chief Justice John
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison,1 these leading voices of the legal
academy call for "popular constitutionalism": a constitutional law that
is defined outside of the courts by the people themselves, "whether we
act in the streets, in the voting booths, or in legislatures as
representatives of others."2
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that popular
constitutionalism is wrong and should be rejected. It is difficult to
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 181 (1999). See
also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2004); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999). Sunstein, who is moving to Harvard Law School in the fall of 2008, focuses on the
judicial, rather than the popular, side of the question and calls his theory "judicial minimalism."
He agrees with Tushnet and Kramer that the people, not the Court, should enjoy the primary
responsibility for determining what the Constitution means.
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overstate the importance of doing so, given how influential Tushnet,
Sunstein, and Kramer are to current thinking about the Supreme
Court's role in American life. For example, both Sunstein and Kramer
previewed as separate Forewords to the Harvard Law Review's annual
survey of the Court's term what they would later explore in their
major books on popular constitutionalism. 3 There is no more
prestigious a platform for a constitutional law scholar than a Harvard
Law Review Foreword.
4
In addition, symposia have been dedicated to discussing the
popular constitutionalism of Tushnet and Kramer,5 and book reviews
published in the nation's leading law journals have commented on
each of the three major books. 6 And while it is not uncommon for
books by law professors at elite law schools to be greeted by the legal
academy with almost as much hoopla as a new Steven Spielberg film
is greeted by Hollywood, the popular constitutionalism tomes of
Tushnet, Sunstein, and Kramer have transcended the ivy tower and
permeated the larger world of ideas. Not only have their books been
reviewed in history and political theory journals, 7 but leading national
magazines and newspapers such as The New Republic, The New York
Review of Books, and The Wall Street Journal have devoted pages to
them.8 If that were not enough, Kramer pled his case for popular
constitutionalism to television viewers across the land in the final
3. See generally Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001);
Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1996). Tushnet
also has penned a Harvard Law Review Foreword, albeit on a different subject than popular
constitutionalism. See generally Mark V. Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and
the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HiARV. L. REV. 29 (1999).
4. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of Harvard "Forewords" A Social
and Intellectual Inquiry, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 463-67 (1994).
5. See, e.g., Symposium, Commentaries on Mark Tushnet's Taking the Constitution Away
from the Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 359 (2000); A Symposium on The People Themselves:
Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 809 (2006).
6. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1594 (2005) (reviewing KRAMER, supra note 2); Neal Devins, The Democracy-
Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971 (1999) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, supra note 2);
Saikrishna B. Prakash, America's Aristocracy, 109 YALE L.J. 541 (1999) (reviewing TUSHNET,
supra note 2).
7. See, e.g., Corey Brettschneider, Popular Constitutionalism and the Case for Judicial
Review, 34 POL. THEORY 516 (2006) (reviewing KRAMER, supra note 2); Stephen B. Presser, Book
Review, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1565 (2005) (same).
8. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis, Whose Constitution Is It, Anyway?: Judicial Review Has Its
Limits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2004, at D8 (reviewing KRAMER, supra note 2); Edmund S. Morgan
& Marie Morgan, Bill of Wrongs, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 10, 2005, at 31 (reviewing KRAMER,
supra note 2); Jeffrey Rosen, The Age of Mixed Results, NEW REPUBLIC, June 28, 1999, at 43
(reviewing SUNSTEIN, supra note 2).
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segment of the recent PBS documentary The Supreme Court,9 while
Sunstein repackaged the argument he made in his academic treatise
so that it would be accessible to a popular audience. 10 Tushnet, a past
president of the Association of American Law Schools, likewise
continues to trumpet the virtues of popular constitutionalism."
Despite all of the attention popular constitutionalism has
received in recent years, no one has presented a systematic critique of
the underlying idea. This Article attempts to fill that void by engaging
in a much-needed exegesis in the history of ideas. Indeed, the one
popular constitutionalist who endeavors to describe the intellectual
origins of popular constitutionalism, Kramer, cuts into the seamless
web of history near the end of the story-seventeenth century
England and colonial America-rather than at the beginning. This
Article tells the story from the beginning.
To make the point somewhat differently, this Article maintains
that popular constitutionalists have paid too much attention to
political outcomes and too little to political philosophy. By exposing
the work of Tushnet, Sunstein, and Kramer for what it is-a series of
lawyers' briefs about policy results-this Article attempts to prove
that the Court, as originally conceived, was expected to do what most
of us still want it to do today: vigorously exercise judicial review to
protect individual rights from-to borrow the title of Kramer's book-
"the people themselves."
Part I of this Article discusses the popular constitutionalism of
Tushnet, Sunstein, and Kramer to illustrate why they need to spend
less time reacting to recent high Court decisions and more time
studying the ancient, medieval, and modern political philosophers of
centuries past. Included in the discussion as a case study of popular
constitutionalism is Michigan's recently enacted anti-affirmative
action amendment: a practical example of popular constitutionalism
rejected by proponents of the theory of popular constitutionalism. Part
II chronicles how a line of political philosophy running from Aristotle's
theory of a mixed constitution through John Adams's modifications of
Montesquieu culminated in the judicial institution embodied in Article
9. See The Supreme Court, Program Four: The Rehnquist Revolution (PBS television
broadcast Feb. 7, 2007). See generally Scott D. Gerber, The Supreme Court, Part I. The Least
Dangerous Branch, 93 J. AM. HIST. 971 (2006) (reviewing the PBS series about the Supreme
Court).
10. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING
COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005).
11. See, e.g., Posting of Mark Tushnet, mtushnet@law.harvard.edu, to
conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu (Nov. 29, 2006) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review) (discussing
the origins of popular constitutionalism).
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III of the U.S. Constitution. It is a complicated story, but a story that
needs telling. Part III explains how the political theory of an
independent judiciary investigated in Part II made the doctrine of
judicial review possible, and how it committed that doctrine to the
protection of individual rights. Part III thereby calls into question the
central tenet of popular constitutionalism discussed in Part I-that
judicial review should be drastically limited, or eliminated
altogether-and provides support for the traditional understanding
that judicial review, robustly practiced, is an indispensable
mechanism for protecting the individual rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. The Article concludes with a caveat about the enterprise
of constitutional law scholarship.
I. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE CONTEMPORARY ASSAULT ON
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Scholars have been opining about the Supreme Court's role in
the American constitutional order since at least 1893, when James
Bradley Thayer published The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law.12 In his article, which has been
described as "the most influential essay ever written on American
constitutional law,"13 Thayer argued that legislators rather than
judges should be the primary arbiters of the Constitution's meaning
and that judges should invalidate only those laws predicated on
clearly erroneous interpretations of the Constitution. 14
Thayer, a political liberal,1 5 was not writing in a vacuum.
Rather, he was reacting to what he perceived as the emerging judicial
activism on behalf of economic liberties that was to culminate in
Lochner v. New York, the 1905 decision in which the Court ruled that
a New York law regulating the hours of bakery workers violated the
12. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
13. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7
(1983). See generally One Hundred Years of Judicial Review: The Thayer Centennial Symposium,
88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1993).
14. Thayer, supra note 12, at 138-42.
15. See Jay Hook, A Brief Life of James Bradley Thayer, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1993)
(noting that while "little is known of Thayer's political activities or sympathies," he was a leader
of a group of intellectuals who in the election of 1884 sparked a national crossover movement
from the Republican party to the Democratic party). Tushnet characterizes Thayer as a
"moderate conservative." Mark Tushnet, Thayer's Target: Judicial Review or Democracy?, 88 NW.
U. L. REV. 9, 23 (1993). Tushnet, however, is a Marxist and most policy positions seem
conservative from a Marxist perspective. See Mark Tushnet, A Marxist Analysis of American
Law, 1 MARXIST PERSP. 96 (1978).
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 As law professor
Barry Friedman has demonstrated in a series of recent articles,
constitutional law scholars have been "obsessed" with the Court's role
in the American regime ever since. 7 And in typical Thayerite fashion,
a particular scholar's opinion on the subject has turned almost
exclusively on whether the Court in question-the Warren Court, the
Rehnquist Court, etc.-is comprised of a majority of Justices who
share the scholar's political views.18 This Part of the Article reveals
that popular constitutionalism is simply the latest reincarnation of
partisan constitutional theorizing that dates from Thayer's famous
essay.
A. Tushnet's Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts
Mark Tushnet's Taking the Constitution Away from the
Courts'9 is the most extreme of the leading works on popular
constitutionalism. The book's title means what it says: the author calls
for a constitutional amendment overruling Marbury v. Madison,20 the
landmark 1803 decision by Chief Justice John Marshall that is widely
credited with establishing the Court's power of judicial review. 2' In its
place, Tushnet asks that we reorient ourselves towards "populist
constitutional law," in which the people and their elected
representatives interpret, and enforce, the Constitution.
22
Tushnet divides Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts
into eight chapters, together with a preface and a prologue. Chapter
One, "Against Judicial Supremacy," is devoted to establishing his
basic framework, with particular attention being afforded to
differentiating between the "thin Constitution" (rights questions) and
the "thick Constitution" (powers questions). Although the book is
primarily about the "thick" question of judicial review, Tushnet spends
most of his time addressing "thin" questions of individual rights,
16. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
18. See Barry Friedman, The Cycles of Constitutional Theory, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
149 (2004).
19. TUSHNET, supra note 2.
20. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
21. See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 175. For a revisionist account of the significance of both
Marbury and Chief Justice Marshall, see Scott Douglas Gerber, Introduction: The Supreme Court
Before John Marshall, in SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 9-11 (Scott
Douglas Gerber ed., 1998) (arguing that pre-Marshall Court Justices both understood and
exercised judicial review).
22. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 181-82.
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which suggests that his real objective-as explained in Section D
below-is to protect Leftist rights precedents.
In Chapters Two ("Doing Constitutional Law Outside the
Courts"), Three ("The Question of Capability"), and Four ("The
Constitutional Law of Religion Outside the Courts"), Tushnet
describes how we can contemplate the Constitution without judicial
decisions to guide us. In Chapters Five ("The Incentive-Compatible
Constitution") and Six ("Assessing Judicial Review"), he maintains
that the abolition of judicial review would not mean less protection for
individual and minority rights. This is perhaps the most counter-
intuitive portion of the book-most of us were taught that the
judiciary's principal function is to protect rights-but Tushnet's
position is not without precedent in the scholarly literature.
23
Chapter Seven ("Against Judicial Review"), likely the book's
most important chapter, suggests how the courts can be denied any
role in constitutional interpretation whatsoever. In Chapter Eight
("Populist Constitutional Law"), Tushnet summarizes his argument-
a law professor's "argument" in the literal sense of the word-for
populist constitutional law.
At the heart of Tushnet's project is his belief that the
Constitution is not so much a collection of written provisions as it is a
set of aspirational principles expressed in the document's preamble
and in the Declaration of Independence that preceded it.24 Here,
Tushnet sounds very much like Clarence Thomas, a Supreme Court
Justice whose confirmation he strongly opposed and whose service on
the Court he seeks to delegitimize. Tushnet is on record as suggesting
that the American people not regard cases decided by the Court by a
5-to-4 vote, with Justice Thomas in the majority, as binding law.
25
Justice Thomas stated his commitment to the principles of the
Declaration of Independence most dramatically in his concurring
opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,26 the Rehnquist Court's
1995 broadside against affirmative action. He wrote:
23. See, e.g., Henry Steele Commager, Judicial Review and Democracy, in JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE SUPREME COURT: SELECTED ESSAYS 64, 73 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1967) ("Congress, and
not the courts, emerges as the instrument for the realization of the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights.").
24. See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 11-12.
25. See Mark V. Tushnet, Clarence Thomas: The Constitutional Problems, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 466, 477 (1995) (reviewing JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING
OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1994)). Tushnet softened his position on Justice Thomas in a later work.
See MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71-72 (2005).
26. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
2008] 1073
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There can be no doubt that the paternalism that appears to lie at the heart of this
[affirmative action] program is at war with the principle of inherent equality that
underlies and infuses our Constitution. See Declaration of Independence ("We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and
the pursuit of Happiness").
2 7
Tushnet certainly does not want to follow Justice Thomas that
far. In fact, Tushnet's writings are replete with support for affirmative
action and other egalitarian policies. For example, in his most recent
biography of Thurgood Marshall, Tushnet declares that Justice
Marshall's "opinions on equality and fair procedures stand as
exemplars of Great Society jurisprudence."28 However, Tushnet fails to
explain how the colorblind principles articulated in the Declaration of
Independence can be reconciled with the color-conscious policies
promoted by Justice Marshall and the other members of the Warren
and Burger Courts whom he so admires.
29
B. Sunstein's One Case at a Time
Like Tushnet, Cass Sunstein attempts to assimilate the
language of judicial restraint into the politics of legal liberalism. His
One Case at a Time30  is subtler than Tushnet's Taking the
Constitution Away from the Courts. Sunstein argues for what he calls
"judicial minimalism," a theory of judicial review that limits the Court
to the specific questions posed by a particular case and discourages it
from handing down broad rulings with sweeping social
consequences. 31 He insists that the broad questions-for example, the
27. Id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that affirmative action in public primary and secondary
education assignment plans is unconstitutional); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 351, 357,
378 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that affirmative action
in public higher education admissions programs is unconstitutional and invoking the Declaration
of Independence). See generally SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE THOMAS (expanded ed. 2002).
28. MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
SUPREME COURT, 1961-1991, at 196 (1997).
29. See SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 173-75 (1995) (arguing that the
Declaration of Independence mandates colorblind constitutionalism).
30. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2.
31. Id. at ix-xi. The prolific Sunstein has repeated his argument for a minimalist approach
in many places in recent years. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 353, 355-56 (2006).
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legality of abortion-should be left for the people to decide through the
process of "deliberative democracy." 32
In brief-like fashion, Sunstein organizes his book into three
sections: "Argument," "Applications," and "Antagonists." The
"Argument" section is itself divided into four chapters in which he
describes, respectively: (1) what his theory of judicial review entails
(although he claims that minimalism is not a "theory" at all); (2) why
his theory is "democracy promoting"; (3) how judicial minimalism can
mitigate the burdens of judicial decisions and the costs of mistakes;
and (4) the "substance" of the decisionmaking "process" he advocates.
Chapter Four is the most troubling of the "Argument" section:
Sunstein formulates "minimalism's substance" in such broad terms
(e.g., "the right to vote," "the rule of law," and "no torture, murder, or
physical abuse by the government")33 as to render it both meaningless
and infinitely malleable by judges, be they "minimalists" or
"maximalists." As explained below, the "Applications" section, where
Sunstein applies his theory of judicial minimalism to several
substantive areas of constitutional law, and the "Antagonists" section,
where he defends it against prospective critics, make plain just how
malleable his theory is.
Sunstein does not argue merely that the Court should be
minimalistic; he also insists that a majority of the Rehnquist Court-
the Justices in power at the time Sunstein's book was published-were
minimalists. 34 He applauds these Justices-Sandra Day O'Connor,
Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen
Breyer-for it. 35 This should not be surprising because the Justices
Sunstein names are liberal on most social issues.36
Contrast Sunstein's praise for these five Justices with what he
says about Justice Thomas. He labels Justice Thomas a judicial
"maximalist":37 a jurist who "often urges the Court to provide wider
judgments and clearer guidance." 38 This does not sound so bad, does
it? What is wrong with clear guidance? It sounds bad to Sunstein,
32. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 24-45.
33. Id. at 63-68.
34. See id. at 9.
35. See id.
36. A recent book on the Rehnquist Court by a respected legal journalist characterizes
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy as liberal on social issues. See JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG,
SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 29-30 (2007).





though. In an interview published in Legal Times shortly after his
book was released, 39 Sunstein singled out Justice Thomas for his
"astonishing" concurring opinion in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island,40 an opinion in which the Justice maintained that commercial
speech should be treated the same as noncommercial speech.
41
Liberals, of course, disdain commercial speech. Burt Neuborne, a law
professor and the former legal director of the American Civil Liberties
Union, for one, complained after the Court's decision in 44 Liquormart
that the First Amendment right to free speech-for decades a favorite
among liberals-is now "the favorite argument for corporations and
advertisers."42
Justice Thomas got it right, though, when he observed in his
concurring opinion that the "[firamers' political philosophy equated
liberty and property" and that there was no "philosophical or
historical basis for asserting that 'commercial' speech is of 'lower
value' than 'noncommercial' speech."43 Put directly, the subordination
of commercial speech to noncommercial speech in the hierarchy of
judicial protection-like the subordination of economic rights to
"personal" rights in general-has been a political decision by Supreme
Court Justices who prefer speech about politics, art, and science to
speech about commerce.
44
Sunstein spends little time on commercial speech. Instead, he
devotes chapters in his "Applications" section to the right to die,
affirmative action, discrimination based on gender and sexual
orientation, and the regulation of communications technologies such
as the Internet. He argues that the nation is currently in "moral flux"
on these issues and that the Court should, and correctly does, leave
the "fundamental questions undecided" in these areas.
46
39. Interview by Ted Leventhal with Cass R. Sunstein, Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished
Serv. Professor of Jurisprudence, Univ. of Chicago, in Chicago, Ill. in Ted Leventhal, On Theory.
Builders and Threats, LEGAL TIMES, June 28, 1999, at 62.
40. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
41. Id. at 522-23 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
42. David G. Savage, Is Amendment Rulings are Out of Order, Liberals Complain, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 1996, at A5 (quoting Professor Neuborne).
43. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
44. GERBER, supra note 27, at 161.
45. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at xi-xiv. After the publication of Sunstein's book, the Court
inserted itself into the fundamental values debate in the Michigan affirmative action cases and
the Texas gay rights case more than Sunstein's theory would suggest it should, although
Sunstein himself was almost certainly pleased with the liberal results of those cases. See, e.g.,
Cass R. Sunstein, Liberty After Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059 (2004). See generally Lawrence




Predictably, however, Sunstein objects when the democratic
process-the process in which he suggests the "fundamental issues"
should be defined-decides these issues in a conservative way. The
issue of affirmative action provides the best example. Remember
Proposition 209, the California referendum that outlawed preferential
treatment based on race? Sunstein certainly does. But he declares that
it does not encompass what he means by democracy. He writes:
Political processes in California on this issue did not appear to be deliberative .... In
the context of affirmative action in particular, there is a danger that referendum
outcomes will not be based on a careful assessment of facts and values, but instead on
crude "we-they" thinking. This is a particular danger in the context of race.
4 6
In short, Sunstein appears willing to put decisions about
fundamental issues of constitutional law in the hands of the American
people, unless the people reach decisions he dislikes. Indeed, in his
"Antagonists" section, Sunstein criticizes Justice Scalia's
jurisprudence, which, like Sunstein's, manifests a preference for
leaving as many decisions as possible to the democratic process, 47 for
failing to promote democracy "rightly understood."
48
C. Kramer's The People Themselves
Robert Bork could have written Larry Kramer's book. As Bork
did before him in The Tempting of America,49 Kramer offers a
historical argument in The People Themselves 50 for a limited judicial
role in constitutional interpretation. There is one notable difference
between the two books: the conservative Bork was arguing against the
liberal activism of the Warren and Burger Courts,51 whereas the
liberal Kramer argues against the conservative activism of the
Rehnquist (and now Roberts?52) Court.53 Kramer closed a 2001
46. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 133.
47. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 1, 22 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that it
is "simply not compatible with democratic theory... that [unelected judges decide] that laws
mean whatever they ought to mean").
48. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 211-12, 261.62. Sunstein reprises his critique of the
conservative federal judiciary in, among other places, RADICALS IN ROBES, supra note 10.
49. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
(1990).
50. KRAMER, supra note 2.
51. See BORK, supra note 49, at 129-32. The Burger Court was a liberal court, too. It gave
the nation Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (legalizing abortion), and Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (permitting the use of race in public higher education
admissions programs).
52. See Michael J. Gerhardt & Larry D. Kramer, Protect Our Rights, Keep the Filibuster,
PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., May 1, 2005, available at http://www.pittsbughlive.com/x/
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Harvard Law Review Foreword about Bush v. Gore54 that served as a
"preliminary version of the history"55 in his book with a call to arms:
"The Supreme Court has made its grab for power. The question is:
[W]ill we let them get away with it?"56
What makes Kramer's book so significant-Tushnet opines on
the dust jacket that The People Themselves "is perhaps the most
important work of constitutional theory and history in a
generation"57-is that it attempts to provide the historical evidence for
the policy arguments of Leftist scholars who wish to limit (Sunstein)
or eliminate (Tushnet) the federal judiciary's role in constitutional
interpretation. Kramer opens by presenting three episodes from the
early American Republic that he claims reveal how our forefathers
"understood their role in popular government in ways that we, who
take so much for granted, do not."5 8 The episodes are (1) popular
celebrations from Maine to Georgia in 1793 over the jury acquittal of
Gideon Henfield on charges that he violated the law of nations by
serving as a French privateer; (2) a popular protest in New York City
against the Jay Treaty in which the crowd shouted down Alexander
Hamilton and hit him with a rock; and (3) public meetings in Virginia,
Kentucky, and other Middle Atlantic states protesting the Alien and
Sedition Act of 1798.59 As a novelist,60 I applaud Kramer's attention-
grabbing Introduction. As a student of the history of ideas, I find the
story he is trying to tell unconvincing.
The heart of Kramer's historical account is Chapter One's
description of the "customary constitution," the notion in English
constitutional history that customs, statutes, common law institutions
like the jury, and certain edicts such as the Magna Carta comprised
the regime's fundamental law.61 Kramer's animating principle is that
England's fundamental law was enforced primarily by "the people
themselves"-hence the title of his book-given how malleable an
pittsburghtrib/s_329413.html (arguing, at the dawn of the Roberts Court era, for the legitimacy
of the filibuster in the confirmation process for judicial nominees).
53. See KRAMER, supra note 2, at 225-30.
54. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
55. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 249.
56. Kramer, supra note 3, at 169.
57. KRAMER, supra note 2 (quoting Mark Tushnet).
58. Id. at 5.
59. Id. at 3-5.
60. See generally SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, THE IVORY TOWER: A NOVEL (2002); ScOTT
DOUGLAS GERBER, THE LAW CLERK: A NOVEL (2007).
61. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 9-34.
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unwritten constitution was.62 For example, he describes how "clear,
convulsive expressions of popular will" were responsible for the
Glorious Revolution of 1688 that ousted King James II and replaced
him with William and Mary. 63 Prior to the American Revolution,
Kramer insists, Americans, as British colonial subjects, shared this
orientation to customary-and, in Kramer's hands, popular-
constitutionalism.
64
By far the most provocative part of Kramer's discussion of
popular constitutionalism in colonial America is his description of the
forms it took: voting, petitioning, pamphleteering, jury service, and
mobbing. 65 Kramer's characterization of mobbing is particularly
startling, in large part because of how casually he approaches the
practice. He writes:
And then there was the mob, or "crowd," as historians have relabeled it to capture its
rediscovered respectability .... Mobbing was an accepted, if not exactly admired, form
of political action-common in England and on the Continent as well as in America.
Crowd action represented a direct expression of popular sovereignty, justified as a last
resort in the writings of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke, not to mention by long
tradition .... Mob action followed implicit, customary rules about how much violence
was appropriate and which targets were permissible, making it possible for
contemporaries to distinguish constitutional mob action from a simple riot.
66
I confess to being uncertain about whether colonial mobs had
"rules"67-the Ultimate Fighting Championship is now said to have
"rules," too6 8 -but I have read enough Locke to know that when "the
people themselves" were behaving in the manner that Kramer
describes, they were revolting against the Constitution, not
interpreting it. In fact, Lockean liberalism posits that the principal
purpose of constitutional government is to protect the people from the
sorts of behavior Kramer endorses. When a constitution proves
incapable of doing that, the people are instructed to replace it. The
Declaration of Independence, a Lockean document if there ever was
one,69 makes this point in unmistakable terms:
62. Id. at 24.
63. Id. at 15.
64. Id. at 34.
65. See id. at 25-27.
66. Id. at 27.
67. Kramer is not the first historian to claim that colonial mobs followed "rules." See, e.g.,
PAULINE MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION: COLONIAL RADICALS AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO BRITAIN, 1765-1776, at 32-34 (1972).
68. See Ultimate Fighting Championship, UFC Rules, http://www.ufc.com/
index.cfm?fa=LearnUFC.Rules (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
69. See Scott D. Gerber, Whatever Happened to the Declaration of Independence? A
Commentary on the Republican Revisionism in the Political Thought of the American Revolution,
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We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. - That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, -
That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its
foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
7 0
Chapter Two finds Kramer considering one of the most
frequently debated questions among constitutional law scholars: the
origins of judicial review.7 1 He acknowledges that, in the years
between the American Revolution and the framing and ratification of
the U.S. Constitution, some lawyers and judges identified clearly a
judge's power to declare void laws that were contrary to a state's
constitution. But he insists that this was a minority view-and that
even for lawyers, such as James Iredell, who subscribed to this view,
"interpretive authority remained with the people.
''72
Kramer's characterization of the origins of judicial review is
implausible, to put it generously, and it also is inconsistent with the
wave of state constitution-making that preceded the federal
Constitution. Kramer asserts that "putting constitutions into writing
was not seen as a profound innovation. '73 Nothing could be further
from the truth.7 4 Indeed, as John Marshall appreciated in Marbury
itself, the founders' decision to reduce their organic laws to writing
was arguably their most significant contribution to the history of
ideas, because it made interpreting organic laws easier, and it
signaled that the judiciary was to be the government institution
26 POLITY 207, 230-31 (1993) (arguing that the founders relied on Locke's writings in drafting
the Declaration of Independence).
70. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
71. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 35. The debate over the origins of judicial review remains as
vibrant as ever. See, e.g., Mary Sarah Bilder, Why We Have Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 215, 215 (2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/01/09/bilder.html (arguing that the
origins of judicial review lie in corporate law); Scott D. Gerber, The Political Theory of an
Independent Judiciary, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 223, 223 (2007),
http://thepocketpart.org/2OO7/O1/O9/gerber.html (disagreeing with Professor Bilder about the
roots of judicial review); William Michael Treanor, Original Understanding and the Whether,
Why, and How of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 218, 219 (2007),
http://thepocketpart.org/2OO7/O1/O9/treanor.html (discussing why judicial review exists). See
generally Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502
(2006).
72. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 58-65.
73. Id. at 55.
74. Kramer backs off his statement as soon as he makes it. See id. (acknowledging that
reducing constitutions to writing "gave a powerful boost to the new awareness of popular
sovereignty").
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ultimately charged with the interpretive function. 75 A number of state
constitutions adopted after the Declaration of Independence contained
stirring testaments to the judiciary's emerging role-emphasis on
emerging, as Part II will explore-in the founders' political
architecture. The Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776 exclaimed,
for example, that "the independency and uprightness of Judges are
essential to the impartial administration of justice, and a great
security to the rights and liberties of the people,"76 and the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780 proclaimed that "[i]t is
the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as free, impartial and
independent as the lot of humanity will admit."77 And while the early
state constitutions were revised many times, the frequency of the
revisions provides more, not less, evidence of the founders'
commitment to institutional solutions to the question of how best to
protect individual rights-the question that the Declaration of
Independence announces as the central concern of the American
regime. 78 Nowhere was this more forcefully stated than in the
preamble to the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, written by John
Adams:
The end of the institution, maintenance, and administration of government, is to secure
the existence of the body politic, to protect it, and to furnish the individuals who
compose it with the power of enjoying in safety and tranquillity their natural rights, and
the blessings of life: and whenever these great objects are not obtained, the people have
a right to alter the government, and to take measures necessary for their safety,
prosperity and happiness.
7 9
Not surprisingly, Kramer's infatuation with popular
constitutionalism also colors his discussion of the framing and
ratification of the U.S. Constitution, the subject that occupies Chapter
Three of his book. He insists that, in 1787, the notion of judicial
review remained fuzzy at best, that the debates surrounding the
framing and ratification of America's second national constitution
were ambiguous on the matter, and that the text of the Constitution
was silent on it.80 Kramer once again fails to appreciate the
significance of political architecture to the men who wrote the
Constitution. He barely mentions in the chapter the theory of
separation of powers, which the framers considered the edifice of the
75. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
76. MD. CONST. OF 1776, Declaration of Rights art. XXX.
77. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, Declaration of Rights art. XXIX.
78. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: ORIGINS AND IMPACT 16.18 (Scott Douglas
Gerber ed., 2002); GERBER, supra note 29, at 1-3.
79. MASS. CONST. pmbl.
80. See KRAMER, supra note 2, at 73-77.
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Constitution's structure. The President has, among other checks, a
veto over congressional bills8 l and the power to nominate federal
judges.82 Congress has, among other checks, the power to override
presidential vetoes8 3 and to control the size and jurisdiction of the
federal courts,8 4 as well as the power to impeach all federal officials.8 5
Without the power of judicial review, what check-what
"constitutional control," in the words of The Federalist86-would the
federal judiciary have on the President or Congress? The answer is:
none. As a consequence, judicial review is an inevitable component of
the Constitution's commitment to checks and balances.
D. The Judicial Brezhnev Doctrine
It does not take a rocket scientist-or a celebrated law
professor, for that matter-to figure out what is going on here.
Kramer,8 7 Tushnet, and Sunstein are afraid that the now-conservative
federal judiciary is rolling back too many of their preferred liberal
rulings. They are announcing, if you will, a kind of judicial Brezhnev
Doctrine: "What we have, we keep."8 8
Nothing if not honest, Tushnet is unambiguous on the matter.
He writes in Chapter Seven ("Against Judicial Review") of Taking the
Constitution Away from the Courts:
Of course I have many views about what the Constitution means. So do you. And of
course if I could guarantee that five justices held exactly the views I have, I would be
wildly in favor of judicial review. So would you. The problem, of course, is that your
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
82. Id. art. II, § 2.
83. Id. art. I, § 7.
84. Id. art. III, § 1.
85. Id. art. I, § 2.
86. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
87. The remainder of Kramer's book is dedicated to post-ratification episodes of popular
constitutionalism, such as President Andrew Jackson's refusal in the 1830s to enforce the Court's
decision that Cherokee Indians could not be removed from their land by the government of
Georgia, and to the rise of so-called judicial supremacy during the heyday of the Warren Court.
These episodes are irrelevant to the original understanding of the Constitution.
88. The "Brezhnev Doctrine" was announced in November 1968 by then-Soviet leader
Leonid Brezhnev to justify the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev declared that the
Soviet Union had a duty to maintain a "correct" vision of socialism in countries within the Soviet
sphere of influence. The doctrine was extended to countries not already within the Soviet sphere
of influence in 1979 by the invasion of Afghanistan. It was renounced by Mikhail Gorbachev in
1989. See MATTHEW J. OUIMET, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE IN SOVIET
FOREIGN POLICY 2-4, 66-88 (2003).
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views and mine might be rather different, and neither of us can guarantee that the
judges will agree with us all the time.
89
Tushnet repeats this theme elsewhere. For example, in a 1998
article for Dissent magazine (reprinted as Chapter Six in Taking the
Constitution Away from the Courts), he explains at length how judicial
review may have been good for the Left during the heyday of the
Warren and Burger Courts, but not under the Rehnquist (and now
Roberts?) Court.90 Tushnet returns to the subject of affirmative
action-the sacred cow of the Left-to illustrate his point. He writes:
"On race discrimination law, it is enough to note that [Brown v. Board
of Education91 ] no longer is the central case dealing with race. Now
the Court's anti-affirmative action decisions are central. '92
Sunstein is careful not to criticize the federal judiciary's
conservative politics in One Case at a Time. However, he did so in a
New York Times op-ed when the book first appeared in print. He
wrote:
Conservative politicians often complain about the decisions of liberal Federal judges
who, they say, do not respect the judgments of elected officials .... But judicial activism
on the part of conservative judges is a much more serious problem, as some Reagan and
Bush appointees have proved far too willing to invalidate decisions made by Congress
and the executive branch.
9 3
To prove his point, Sunstein described a 1999 D.C. Circuit
Court ruling that struck down a provision of the Clean Water Act
94
and a series of Fourth Circuit decisions 95 (the same circuit that called
89. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 155.
90. Mark Tushnet, Is Judicial Review Good for the Left?, DISSENT, Winter 1998, at 65.
91. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
92. Tushnet, supra note 90, at 66. Tushnet's anti-judicial review book was written before
the Court decided the University of Michigan and Seattle and Louisville affirmative action cases.
See generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007)
(Seattle and Louisville cases); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (University of Michigan
law school case); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (University of Michigan undergraduate
school case).
93. Cass R. Sunstein, Op-Ed., The Courts'Perilous Right Turn, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1999, at
A25.
94. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), affd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
95. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en
banc) (holding that the provision of the Violence Against Women Act creating a private right of
action for victims of gender-motivated violence exceeded Congress's powers under the Commerce
Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000); Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the Driver's
Privacy Protection Act violated the Tenth Amendment and exceeded Congress's power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment), rev'd, 528 U.S. 141 (2000); United States v. Wilson,
133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997) (striking down a provision of the Clean Water Act as applied in EPA
regulations because it exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause).
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Miranda v. Arizona96 into serious question 97) on behalf of states'
rights.98 "All too often," Sunstein insisted, "conservative judicial
activists ignore other reasonable interpretations of the Constitution to
entrench their own and do so at the expense of democratic self-rule."99
If that were not enough, in 2005 Sunstein repackaged One Case at a
Time as Radicals in Robes, 100 an updated and unabashed polemic
against the conservative federal judiciary.
Leftist politics likewise drive Kramer's efforts to minimize the
federal judiciary's role in the American constitutional order. For
example, I mentioned above how Kramer's anger at the Court's
decision in Bush v. Gore fueled his historical narrative.10 1 L.A. Powe,
Jr., who is himself sympathetic to the notion of popular
constitutionalism, is similarly unimpressed with Kramer's history:
By jumping ninety years from Jackson to FDR, Kramer omits and ignores the most
stunningly successful example of popular constitutionalism in American history. That,
of course, is the white South's combined use of terrorism and the ballot, first to
overthrow the Reconstruction governments and then to nullify the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments for generations. In one of the most egregious historical errors I
have seen in law reviews, Kramer (without citations) places the blame for the end of
Reconstruction at the feet of the Court. Seldom does a theory-in this case, people good,
Court bad-beget such a wrong-headed factual conclusion. Omitting Reconstruction and
the Trail of Tears, plus all of the modern examples [chronicled in Powe's review essay],
offers evidence that Kramer sees popular constitutionalism only when he approves of
the cause. 102
E. The 2006 Michigan Anti-Affirmative Action Amendment
Kramer, Sunstein, and Tushnet are not the only popular
constitutionalists whose unshakeable dedication to the Left's political
agenda casts doubt on the strength of their commitment to popular
constitutionalism. This was made abundantly clear following the
November 2006 amendment to the Michigan Constitution banning
state-sponsored affirmative action in Michigan.
The amendment, commonly known as "Prop 2," provides that
"[t]he state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential
96. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
97. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 684-92 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding
admissibility of confessions in federal court to be governed by statute, which allowed admission
of voluntary confessions, rather than by the rule of Miranda), rev'd, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
98. See Sunstein, supra note 93.
99. Id.
100. SUNSTEIN, supra note 10.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
102. L.A. Powe, Jr., Are "the People" Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 855, 887 (2005) (reviewing KRAMER, supra note 2).
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treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color,
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment,
public education or public contracting."103 Given that Prop 2 appears
to be a textbook example of popular constitutionalism, I was curious to
learn how proponents of the theory felt about it. In a column I wrote
for Findlaw.com, I discussed my attempts to do just that. 104
The campaign for the passage of Prop 2 was spearheaded by
Ward Connerly and Jennifer Gratz. Connerly is a wealthy African
American Republican who helped pass a similar amendment to the
California Constitution a decade before. Gratz was one of the plaintiffs
in the 2003 U.S. Supreme Court decisions that held, as a matter of
federal constitutional law, that the University of Michigan may
consider the race of applicants as a factor in admissions decisions,
provided that race is not used too mechanically and that all applicants
are evaluated on an individualized basis.
10 5
Gratz, a white applicant, won her lawsuit against the
University of Michigan undergraduate college to which she had been
denied admission. 06 The Court concluded that it was unconstitutional
for the college's admissions process to award an applicant a set
number of points solely because the applicant was not white.
10 7
Barbara Grutter, another white applicant, lost her lawsuit against the
University of Michigan Law School.108 The Court decided that race
was only one factor among many in the law school's admissions
process and endorsed the approach articulated by Justice Lewis
Powell in his famous separate opinion in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke:10 9 Race may be so used in order to achieve
"diversity" in higher education. 1 0
By enacting Prop 2, the people of Michigan rejected the use of
state-sponsored affirmative action as a matter of state constitutional
law and thereby nullified the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in the
University of Michigan cases in the state of Michigan.
103. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26, cl. 2.
104. The discussion that follows in this Section draws from Scott D. Gerber, Michigan's
Controversial Proposition 2, Eliminating Affirmative Action in the State: A Good Example of
Popular Constitutionalism?, FINDLAW.COM, Nov. 16, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
commentary/20061116_gerber.html.
105. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
106. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251.
107. Id. at 271-72.
108. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343-44.
109. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
110. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324-25.
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I became interested in learning how proponents of popular
constitutionalism felt about Prop 2 after a colleague posted on
ConLawProf that a pro-affirmative action group called By Any Means
Necessary ("BAMN") had filed a lawsuit requesting that a court
invalidate the November 7 decision by the people of Michigan. On the
one hand, Prop 2 is precisely what popular constitutionalists had
envisioned: the people of Michigan had defined what the state's
constitution means. On the other hand, most popular
constitutionalists are on the political left and are strong supporters of
affirmative action.
I believed that the BAMN litigation was destined to fail
because the Court had ruled in the University of Michigan cases that
Michigan may-not must-consider race in its admissions decisions
under federal equal protection law, but the merits of the litigation
were not what interested me. I posted to ConLawProf: "Separate and
apart from the merits of the argument presented to a court, I would be
curious to learn what proponents of popular constitutionalism feel
about this effort to ask a court to declare an amendment by 'the people
themselves' unconstitutional."
I spent much of the next day and a half pouring through the
dozens of replies to my query. The first reply maintained that Prop 2
merely was part of an "ongoing" debate "over the place of race and
gender conscious diversity programs in public institutions." Under
that interpretation of what happened on November 7, popular
constitutionalism means that some people-for example,
administrators at the University of Michigan-can ignore what the
majority of the people have said if they do not want to hear it. I
informed the list that the proffered definition seemed strange to me.
After all, what was passed on November 7 was a popularly enacted
amendment to the state's constitution.
Another reply insisted that Prop 2 was not a legitimate
exercise of popular constitutionalism because its language was "so
confusing, many people voted to ban affirmative action, believing that
they were voting in favor of it." But this particular reply failed to
appreciate that the amendment unambiguously prohibits "preferential
treatment" on the basis of, among other things, "race." The idea of
preferential treatment is easy to understand, and the reply gave
Michigan voters-educated by numerous ads and counter-ads about
Prop 2-much too little credit.
Still another reply insisted that there was no reason why a
popular constitutionalist should think that the people of Michigan
should have the last word on the meaning of the federal Constitution,
1086 [Vol. 61:4:1067
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"which is what the opponents of the amendment are relying on." But,
of course, the people of Michigan amended their state constitution, not
the federal Constitution-and as to the meaning of their state
constitution, they surely do have the last word.
Moreover, as one of the small handful of opponents of
affirmative action in the legal professoriate replied, such a position is
elitist. In other words, this conservative law professor explained, Prop
2 is
based in large part on a notion that constitutional guarantees of equality (even if the
public isn't aware specifically of the 14th Amendment's [equal protection] clause)
prohibit government discrimination based on race, period. Just like much of the
opposition to gun control is based on a notion that there is a constitutional right to bear
arms, even among people who've never read the Second Amendment. If "popular
constitutionalism" is restricted to individuals specifically studying specific parts of the
Constitution and coming to informed conclusions about the wrongness of specific [U.S.
Supreme Court] decisions, that would mean that "popular constitutionalism" would
mean "law professor (and a few others) constitutionalism."
I could not have said it better myself.
Another reply characterized what happened in Michigan as a
mere "policy" judgment by the people of Michigan. No one seemed to
take this post seriously. The Michigan Constitution was changed on
November 7.
Yet another reply suggested that a popular constitutionalist is
simply opposed to judicial supremacy, not judicial review. Under this
strand of popular constitutionalism, the author of the reply insisted,
judges are permitted to interpret the constitution, but legislators have
the final say.
I posted two reactions to this reply: (1) popular
constitutionalists who seek to eliminate, rather than limit, judicial
review-Tushnet, for example-cannot be characterized in such a
fashion; and (2) the Michigan legislature had nothing to do with what
happened in Michigan on November 7-again, the people of the state
amended their constitution.
Arguments in favor of both popular constitutionalism and the
BAMN litigation continued to flood my inbox like ads from
amazon.com during the height of the holiday shopping season. I found
none of them persuasive.
Finally, one response did give me pause. A poster whom I know
to be an African American proponent of affirmative action reported
that "only 14% (or something similar to that) of minority voters
supported it. So [affirmative action] was rejected essentially by white
voters." She remarked that this made her "question whether this vote
was popular constitutionalism, or simply self-interest by whites who
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assume (falsely) [that] their opportunities will be substantially limited
by affirmative action."
For me, this post captured why the popular constitutionalist
assault on judicial review is misguided. As John Hart Ely reminded
the legal academy a generation ago in his classic book Democracy and
Distrust, judicial review must be available to ensure that the political
process is functioning properly. 1 ' When "discrete and insular
minorities"'112 are prohibited from participating fairly in the political
process, a court must step in to eliminate the barriers to democratic
participation.
Unfortunately for the opponents of Prop 2, the BAMN litigation
is not about leveling barriers to democratic participation in Michigan
on November 7. There were not any barriers. Instead, the litigation is
about asking a judge to tell the people of Michigan that they cannot
define what their constitution means through their state's
constitutional amendment process. No judge is likely to say that to
"the people themselves."
II. FROM ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF A MIXED CONSTITUTION TO JOHN
ADAMS'S MODIFICATIONS OF MONTESQUIEU
There has to be a better way for deciding what the Court's role
in the American constitutional order should be than the politically
motivated arguments of popular constitutionalism, the "constitutional
theory du jour."13 I believe there is a better way, and I believe it is
discernable through an exegesis in the history of ideas. After all, the
founders of the American regime were steeped in the history of ideas,
and the Constitution they created expressed their commitment to the
power of ideas. 1 4 As I mentioned in the Introduction, it is a
complicated story, but a story that needs to be told: especially when a
leading popular constitutionalist such as Kramer claims to be
exploring the intellectual origins of the Court's role in American life,
yet takes up the story near the end-seventeenth century England
and colonial America-rather than at the beginning. 115 The story
111. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
112. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
113. Alexander & Solum, supra note 6, at 1594.
114. The American founders were widely read in political philosophy. E.g., H. TREVOR
COLBOURN, THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE: WHIG HISTORY AND THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1965); Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on
Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 189 (1984).
115. But see Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Bringing the People Back In, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 653, 666
(2005) (reviewing KRAMER, supra note 2) ("Every work of history must cut into the seamless web
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starts with Aristotle and the theory of a mixed constitution. The next
chapter is written by Polybius in his characterization of the Roman
Constitution, and Polybius is followed by Marsilius of Padua's famous
critique of Pope John XXII during the Middle Ages, Sir John
Fortescue's writings about fifteenth century English political
institutions, and Gasparo Contarini's paean of praise to the Venetian
Constitution during the sixteenth century. The story takes a dramatic
turn when King Charles I commits Anglo-American constitutional
theory to balance among government institutions, rather than
dominance by one, and reaches its climax with Montesquieu's famous
idea that political power should be divided among the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of government. John Adams writes
the concluding chapter when he develops the political architecture of
an independent judiciary in his 1776 pamphlet, Thoughts on
Government. The epilogue is penned by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution when they memorialize Adams's political architecture in
Article III, and by John Marshall and other early American judges
when they engage in the ultimate expression of judicial independence:
judicial review.
A. Aristotle
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), born in northern Greece, was the most
notable of Plato's students.116 He devoted his life to researching,
teaching, and writing about philosophy. 117 Although the Politics is the
work on which the present discussion will focus, Aristotle concluded
his Nicomachean Ethics by advising that the correct way to live is
virtuously and that government should be structured in a manner so
as to allow it.118 The Politics addresses the question of government
structure. 119
Eight books comprise the Politics. Three are particularly
relevant to understanding Aristotle's conception of what is now
regarded as the separation of powers. Book 3, entitled "Definition and
somewhere. Kramer does so in Chapter 1 by portraying a 'customary constitution' shared on both
sides of the Atlantic before the American Revolution."). As Part II will suggest, Hulsebosch's
otherwise insightful review of Kramer's book commits a fatal error by failing to appreciate how
important earlier contributions to the history of ideas were in identifying the Court's place in the
American constitutional order.
116. E.g., GEORGE GROTE, ARISTOTLE 1-9 (2d ed. 1880).
117. Id.
118. See generally ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS xxii (David Ross trans., 1998) (350
B.C.) (arguing that "well-being... consist[s] in good activity").




Division of Regime," details many of Aristotle's concerns about the
vulnerabilities of a form of government that leaves people to do as
they please. 120 Aristotle never refers to the separation of powers in the
book, but many of the points he makes in this portion of the Politics
illustrate why he later divides government into different parts. Book
4, "The Best Regime," explores, at a general level, the aspects of
proper government that can protect the people from tyranny. 121 Book
6, "Division and Description of the Other Regimes," is the most
significant of the books with respect to the separation of powers
because it explains how government power should be allocated. 122
In Book 3, Chapter 16, Aristotle writes:
Now, anyone who bids the law to rule seems to bid god and intellect alone to rule, but
anyone who bids a human being to rule adds on also the wild beast. For desire is such a
beast, and spiritedness perverts rulers even when they are the best of men. Hence law is
intellect without appetite. 123
Here, in a passage from a chapter entitled "Arguments against Total
Kingship," Aristotle succinctly presents the rationale that the framers
of the U.S. Constitution would employ when explaining the need for
the separation of powers: the inevitable tendency of rulers to abuse
their power and the concomitant necessity that the rulers "should be
many and not one alone. 124
Book 4 finds Aristotle explaining how the citizenry should be
composed in the "best regime. ' 125 He envisions a city-state in which all
citizens are educated and, therefore, are equally suitable to participate
in government, albeit at different levels.126 The concern raised in Book
3 regarding the tyranny of a total kingship is thus avoidable, provided
that government can be divided among the educated citizenry in a
120. Scholars disagree about how to order the eight books of the Politics. The present
discussion adopts the ordering of ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE (Peter L. Phillips
Simpson trans., 1997) (350 B.C.), upon whose translation this Section relies.
121. Tyranny is, of course, inconsistent with a regime committed to the protection of
individual rights. See FRED D. MILLER, JR., NATURE, JUSTICE, AND RIGHTS IN ARISTOTLE'S
POLITICS 157, 212-13 (1995) (noting that the tyranny regime promotes the "advantage" of the
monarch).
122. ARISTOTLE, supra note 120, at 6.14.1297b35-1299al.
123. Id. at 3.16.1287a28-31.
124. Id. at 3.16.1287b23; see also id. at 3.17.1287b43-44 ("[I]t is neither advantageous nor
just for one man to have control over everything ... .
125. Id. at 4.1.1323a14-20.
126. Id. at 4.13.1332a38. Aristotle acknowledges in Book 6 that it is impractical for all
citizens to be educated. Those who are not, he advises, should be responsible for supplying
necessities and luxuries to the city-state. Id. at 6.4.1290b37-40, 6.4.1291a6-21.
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proper fashion. As mentioned above, the allocation of government
power is the theme of Book 6.127
Aristotle maintains in Book 6 that three parts of government
are common in all regimes. He writes:
Let us, with regard to what comes next, discuss each regime again both together and
separately, taking as our beginning what is appropriate to the subject. All regimes have
three parts, and the serious legislator must study by reference to them what is of
advantage to each regime. As long as these parts are in a noble condition, the regime
must necessarily be in a noble condition, and regimes differ from each other by the way
each of these differs. One of the three is what deliberates about common matters, a
second is what concerns the offices (that is to say, which offices there should be, with
control over what things, and in what way they should be chosen), and a third is what
decides law suits.
12 8
Obviously, these three parts of government do not coincide
precisely with the legislative, executive, and judicial powers contained
in the U.S. Constitution. The "deliberative" part is most similar to
Congress, in that it is charged with making the laws. However, this
part also presumably includes the ruler-the president, or in
Aristotle's case, the king-a state of affairs not unlike the modified
theory of separation of powers (i.e., checks and balances) actually
embodied in the Federal Constitution of 1787. The deliberative part
likewise would take on a judicial role with respect to "common
matters" (defined below). The "offices" part is similar to the
administrative component of the Constitution's executive power. The
"law courts" part is seemingly on all fours with the judicial power,
given that it "decides law suits."
Turning to the "deliberative" part in more detail, this is to be
the controlling part of the city-state, 129 and it is to decide all "common
matters," which Aristotle defines as war and peace, alliances and their
dissolution, laws, death, exile, confiscation, and the selection and
auditing of offices. 130 Although the deliberative part controls the city-
state, the laws are superior to this part, and all parts, because
otherwise there would be tyranny.131 The composition of the
deliberative part depends on which regime is in place: free-born
citizens (democracy), the rich (oligarchy), the virtuous (aristocracy), or
a combination of these groups (mixed regimes such as polity and so-
127. In Book 5, "Education in the Best Regime," Aristotle argues that understanding the law
is a key component of education in the best regime. Id. at 5.1.1337a11-17.
128. Id. at 6.14.1297b35.
129. Id. at 6.14.1298b34.
130. Id. at 6.141298a3-8.
131. Id. at 7.8.1308a3-34. For more on Aristotle's commitment to the rule of law, see MILLER,
supra note 121, at 82-84.
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called aristocracy). 132 The power of the deliberative part is checked in
the mixed regime, at least in theory, by its membership and by the
fact that all the different parts of the city-state are supposed to be
represented in it.133
With respect to the "offices," this part's role is to address the
"cares of the city."'1 34 By "offices," Aristotle means those "assigned
certain matters for deliberation, judgment, and the issuing of
commands" over "certain matters."'135 He admits that it is impossible
to define each office precisely, because there are always different
concerns depending on which city-state is being analyzed. However, he
does identify three general types of offices, which are presumably
necessary in every city-state: political (e.g., military general),
economic (i.e., an office concerned with the supply and distribution of
food to the city-state), and offices "to do with deliberation on common
affairs" (e.g., police). 136 Appointment to a particular office occurs
through election or lot.137
The Politics identifies eight different "law courts," listed by
jurisdiction: audits, crimes involving "common matters," matters
affecting the regime, disputes between rulers or magistrates and
private persons over fines, private transactions of "some magnitude,"
homicides, foreigners, and small claims. 138 Whether Aristotle intends
this list to be exhaustive is not clear, and the composition of the law
courts depends on the nature of the regime. Aristotle writes: "The first
of these courts, those appointed from all deciding all cases, are
popular; the second, those appointed from some deciding all cases, are
oligarchic; the third, some courts are appointed from all and others
from some, are aristocratic and proper to polity."13 9
Aristotle's power distribution schema is certainly not identical
to that embodied in the U.S. Constitution. There is much more
commingling of powers in Aristotle's system. For example, Aristotle
provides that the deliberative part of the city-state has the authority
to remove a "common matter" of great concern from the law courts and
decide the matter itself.140 Congress, in contrast, could never take a
132. ARISTOTLE, supra note 120, at 6.14.1298a28-blO.
133. Id. at 7.8.1308b24-30.
134. Id. at 6.15.1299a14-30.
135. Id. at 6.15.1299a27-29.
136. Id. at 8.8.1322b29-36; see also id. at 6.15.1300b9-12.
137. Id. at 6.15.1300a9-21.
138. Id. at 6.16.1300b19-37.
139. Id. at 6.16.1301a11-14.




case from the Supreme Court and issue its own decision. 141 However,
the two systems are not as dissimilar in this regard as generally is
perceived. If Congress does not like a particular Supreme Court
decision involving the interpretation of a federal statute, Congress is
free to change the statute. Moreover, the only occasion in Aristotle's
schema in which the deliberative part is permitted to trump the law
courts' power is when common matters of great concern are at issue.1 42
In short, the deliberative part is not free to take any matter it wants
from the law courts and decide it.
This said, there is a major difference between Aristotle's
approach to the distribution of government power and that embodied
in the U.S. Constitution. The focus throughout the Politics is on the
distribution of power pursuant to class structure, rather than
government function. For example, Aristotle criticizes the two
"traditional" types of regimes, oligarchy and democracy, because they
fail to address adequately the tensions between the poor and the
rich. 1 43 In an oligarchy the few (the rich) rule over the many (the poor),
while in a democracy the many rule over the few. Because the rich and
the poor are at odds in both types of regimes, and because it is
impossible for one person to be rich and poor at the same time, these
regimes are deviant. 144 In contrast, the "best regime"-alternatively
called "kingship" or "aristocracy"-finds the different classes of the
city-state represented in the previously described governmental
parts.' 45 (Precisely how each class is represented in the government
depends on the type of regime the city-state can create. 46) It is this
emphasis on class rather than function-the so-called Aristotelian
theory of mixed government-with which the Politics is most closely
associated.' 47 The mixed constitution-the "mikte"-is not the ideal
form of government in Aristotle's political science, but it is the best
attainable, combining as it does aspects of democracy, oligarchy, and
141. But see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (granting Congress an "exceptions" power over the
Court's appellate jurisdiction); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868) (upholding Congress's
repeal of the Court's statutory appellate jurisdiction in a habeas corpus case before it and then
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction); Henry M. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364-65 (1953) (arguing that the
exceptions clause, as interpreted by McCardle, leads to the result that Congress may eliminate
the Court's appellate jurisdiction).
142. ARISTOTLE, supra note 120, at 8.2.1317b17-1318a2.
143. Id. at 7.9.1310a2-11.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 6.4.1290al-b20.
146. Id. at 6.4.1290a5-12.
147. E.g., KURT VON FRITZ, THE THEORY OF THE MIXED CONSTITUTION IN ANTIQUITY 81
(1956). Aristotle adapted his classification scheme from Plato's Statesman. Id.
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monarchy so that no group of citizens is able to abuse the rights of
others. 148
B. Polybius
In his 1999 book about the origins of checks-and-balances
theory, political historian Scott Gordon denies that Aristotle, or any
other ancient Greek philosopher, contributed anything significant to
the modern theory of separation of powers embodied in the U.S.
Constitution. 149 Instead, Gordon credits the Greek-Roman historian
Polybius with providing the idea's genesis.
1 50
Polybius (203-123 B.C.) was influential in Greek politics.
However, his lasting contribution to constitutional theory is The
Histories, a multi-volume account of the rapid, almost unprecedented
rise of Roman power in the world.151 Polybius was held hostage in
Rome for seventeen years and lived in Rome for several more years
after he was freed.' 52 He therefore acquired extensive personal insight
into the Roman system of government. 53 Book 6 of his forty-volume
history is where separation of powers scholars have focused their
attention.154 Polybius does not develop a constitutional theory of his
own in the book. He describes the Roman Constitution from the fifth
century B.C. until the fall of the Roman Republic and characterizes
148. See generally MILLER, supra note 121, at ch. 7 (discussing Aristotle's acceptance of a
"second-best" constitution as one that is achievable in practice).
149. SCOTT GORDON, CONTROLLING THE STATE: CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM ANCIENT ATHENS
TO TODAY 83-84 (1999).
150. Id. Many scholars disagree. E.g., M.I. FINLEY, POLITICS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 58
(1983) (noting that Aristotle sketched the basic outlines of separation of powers theory "after the
fact"); MILLER, supra note 121, at 259-61 (arguing that it is an "exaggeration to deny Aristotle
has any idea of checks and balances"); M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS 23-26 (2d ed. 1998) (same). As Section II.A indicates, I agree with those scholars who
maintain that the origins of modern separation of powers theory can be found in Aristotle's
Politics. Simpson adds an interesting twist: "Aristotle might even see the modern separation of
powers as another (oligarchic) sophistry to deceive the populace. For under color of dividing
power into different parts, it actually concentrates all of it into the same hands." SIMPSON, supra
note 119, at 342. Simpson is probably correct as a matter of political practice-American politics
is usually dominated by the rich-but the theory of the American Constitution is to the contrary.
151. F.W. Walbank, Introduction to 1 POLYBIUS, THE HISTORIES vii, vii-viii (Evelyn S.
Shuckburgh trans., 1962) (146 B.C.).
152. GORDON, supra note 149, at 107-08.
153. Id.
154. E.g., FRITZ, supra note 147, at 306; GORDON, supra note 149, at 107-10; see also
ANDREW LINTOTT, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 16-26 (1999); E.P.
PANAGOPOULOUS, ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF CHECKS AND BALANCES 16-21
(1985).
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the Roman Constitution as the type that all civilizations should aspire
to emulate.
155
Polybius applies the Aristotelian theory of mixed government
in his analysis of the Roman Constitution. 156 This schema-
government by the one, the few, and the many-was reflected in the
Roman Constitution in the following manner: monarchy was
represented by the consuls, oligarchy by the senate, and democracy by
the people (i.e., all of the full citizens of Rome participating in the
assembly).
There were two consuls (technically, then, it was government
by the "two," rather than the "one").157 Each was elected by the
assembly for a one-year term and each, at least until the end of the
Republic, was required to be a member of the aristocracy. Consuls, "as
masters of all public affairs," had considerable power. All other
magistrates, with the exception of the plebeian tribunes, were subject
to their commands. Consuls were responsible for bringing urgent
matters before the senate. They convoked the assembly. They
introduced bills on which the assembly was to vote. They executed the
assembly's decisions. They had unfettered discretion to dispense funds
from the public treasury. They also enjoyed total control of the
military, including the power to punish those who served under their
command.
The senate was comprised of members of the aristocracy.
158
Senators served for life. They controlled the public treasury
(expenditures by the consuls excepted). They managed relations with
foreign embassies, investigated crimes committed in Italy, and were
responsible for settling disputes arising in Italy that were of public
interest.
The people elected all public officers. They also had the power
to confer honors and inflict punishment, "the two devices by which
monarchies and republics, and in fact all human societies, are held
together."159 They possessed the power to impose the death penalty, to
try men for fines in certain cases, and to approve or reject legislation
proposed by the consuls. The popular assembly exercised considerable
decisionmaking authority regarding war and peace and had the final
say over whether treaties with foreign states would be ratified.
155. See FRITZ, supra note 147, at 384-85. This source has been used as the translation of
The Histories throughout this Section.
156. For the relevant text, see id. at 367.
157. Polybius discusses the powers of the consuls at part 12 of Book 6. Id.
158. Polybius discusses the senate at part 13 of Book 6. Id.
159. Polybius discusses the powers reserved to the people at part 14 of Book 6. Id. at 369-70.
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Scholars long have debated the accuracy of Polybius's
characterization of the powers of the three "branches" of the ancient
Roman government.160 However, they agree that Polybius explicates a
checks-and-balances approach to the Roman Constitution. 16 1 Gordon
makes the point in particularly strong terms: "Whether or not one
should regard Polybius as correct in interpreting Rome (or Sparta) in
terms of a model of countervailing powers, he was the first writer to
make a clear statement of that model and, as such, occupies a place of
exceptional importance in the history of constitutional theory."'162
Polybius describes the checks and balances of the Roman
Constitution as possessing the following characteristics.1 63 The senate
can check the consuls' power by, among other methods, withholding
resources the consuls need to wage war (e.g., food, equipment, and
compensation for soldiers) and refusing to extend a consul's command
over a particular military campaign when his consul term expires. The
people can check the consuls' power by annulling treaties or other
agreements a consul may have negotiated with an enemy or foreign
nation, insisting on a full accounting of actions taken by the consuls,
and controlling who is elected to which magistracies, including to the
consulship itself. The people can check the senate by, among other
means, reducing the privileges, public honors, and powers of the
senate and the private possessions of the senators (provided a bill to
these effects was introduced in the assembly by a consul or senator)
and by forbidding the execution of senate decrees (provided a plebeian
tribune requested it). The senate can check the people via its control
160. E.g., id. at 161 (providing a specific example where Polybius's description of "legal and
actual powers" seems inconsistent); LINTOTT, supra note 154, at 17 (noting that Polybius himself
warns us that his account is a simplification").
161. E.g., LINTOTT, supra note 154, at 23 (noting that as Polybius describes it, any
"overambitious element" of the Roman regime "finds that it is not independent but is checked by
the countertension and opposition of the other elements"). Fritz is in notable disagreement.
FRITZ, supra note 147, at 217-19 (arguing that "the political order of the Roman Republic can
neither be called a mixed constitution nor a system of checks and balances" during the period
Polybius describes).
162. GORDON, supra note 149, at 109; see also LINTOTT, supra note 154, at 24 ('The idea that
the constitution is not only mixed, but founded on checks and balances, does not emerge
gradually from the discussion, but is a presumption at the start or, if you like, a theorem which
is proved"); VILE, supra note 150, at 40 (Polybius "provided the pattern for the transformation of
the theory of mixed government into a theory of checks and balances, in which the agencies of
government might not all have a distinct 'class' to represent, but might, of themselves, provide
an institutional check within the government structure").
163. Polybius discusses the ways in which the powers retained by the Roman consuls,
senate, and people can act as a check on one another at parts 15, 16, and 17 of Book 6. FRITZ,
supra note 147, at 370-72.
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over public contracts, and the consuls can check the people pursuant
to their absolute control over persons engaged in military service.
Before turning to the specific question of judicial power, the
focus of the present Article, it is important to note that the allocation
of all government power under the Roman Constitution was changing
frequently. 164 For example, at the beginning of the Roman Republic,
consuls seemingly had absolute power over political decisions,
whereas later the senate exercised many of the powers formerly held
by the consuls, like the foreign affairs power. 165 In other words, while
occupants of American constitutional offices have expressly defined
functions (at least in formalistic terms), government officials under
the Roman Constitution did not necessarily occupy offices with
prescribed functions (e.g., when the consuls were preoccupied with
war, the senate exercised some of their other powers).
All three "branches" of the Roman government possessed some
degree of judicial power. The consuls, along with lesser magistrates
appointed by them, exercised the majority of the judicial functions. 166
Prior to a couple of events explained below, there were only two
exceptions to this allocation of judicial power. First, in trials
concerning capital crimes, the accused could be convicted only by a
majority vote of the people. 67 Second, the senate was endowed with
jurisdiction over disputes of great public importance. 68 In these
disputes, senators would serve as trial judges. However, what
constituted a dispute of great public importance was determined
through a majority vote of the people.16 9 Kurt von Fritz concludes in
his exegesis on Polybius's political ideas that the judicial power was
distributed in this manner to protect the people from oppression by
their social superiors. 170
Historical events impacted the allocation of the judicial power
described above. The most notable event was the passage of the
Valerio-Horatian laws in or about 449 B.C. These laws, the enactment
of which is arguably the single most important event in Roman history
with respect to the separation of powers, established the inviolability
164. See generally LINTOTT, supra note 154, at 208-13 (describing changes over time in the
balance of power among the various elements of the Roman Republic).
165. Id.
166. FRITZ, supra note 147, at 367.
167. Id. at 369. But see LINTOTT, supra note 154, at 150-56 (finding Polybius's description
inconsistent both internally and given external evidence of the practices of the period).
168. FRITZ, supra note 147, at 368.
169. Id. at 371.
170. Id. at ch. 9.
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of the plebeian tribunes. 171 The tribunes were elected by the people,
and those elected were the most respected people of their class. Under
the Valerio-Horatian laws, a plebeian tribune could intervene in any
judicial proceeding in which it believed a plebeian was being treated
inappropriately. 172 In effect, this meant that the tribune, although not
officially a judicial body, could decide the plebeian's fate, provided that
the tribune reached its decision with the best interests of Rome in
mind. Significantly, the tribune's decision could not be reversed by the
consuls or the senate.
173
Another event that affected the judicial power in the Roman
Republic occurred during the aftermath of the Gauls' conquest of
Rome in 388 B.C.1 74 After Rome reclaimed its territory, many property
disputes ensued. In fact, there were so many disputes to resolve that
the consuls had little time for their other responsibilities. As a result,
praetorships were established to perform the consuls' judicial duties.
Praetors were elected by the people, but the senate and the consuls
could summon them to military service, if necessary.
As the preceding analysis of Book 6 of The Histories suggests,
Polybius was describing a system of government in which power was
distributed among different elements of government in a fashion that
permitted each element to check and balance the others. He writes in
an oft-quoted passage that the Roman Constitution was "so equally
and harmoniously balanced, both in the structure of the political
system and in the way it functioned in everyday practice, that even a
native could not have determined definitely whether the state as a
whole was an aristocracy, a democracy, or a monarchy."'175 Polybius's
description of the Roman Constitution therefore seems similar to the
standard characterization of the U.S. Constitution. However, the two
constitutional systems are markedly different in that the institutions
comprising the Roman Constitution were evolving constantly, whereas
the institutions established by the U.S. Constitution always have
performed designated core functions (at least in formalistic terms).
With respect specifically to the judicial power, although there never
existed in ancient Rome a branch of government whose sole
responsibility was to adjudicate disputes, the Romans recognized that
171. Id. at 326-27.
172. Id. at 174.
173. Id. The Valerio-Horatian laws also empowered the plebeian tribunes to make laws
binding upon the whole people. Id. The laws were named for two consuls who supported them.
Id. at 174-75.
174. For the relevant text, see id. at 180-81.
175. Id. at 367.
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disputes needed to be adjudicated in a reasoned and unbiased manner.
This, as will be discussed below, also helps to explain why the U.S.
Constitution establishes an independent federal judiciary. But unlike
the U.S. Constitution, and much like the Aristotelian theory of mixed
government, Rome distributed the judicial power among different
classes of the Republic, instead of assigning it to a specific institution
of government. Revealingly, by distributing power among the different
social classes as it did, the Roman Constitution eventually failed in at
least one crucial respect in which the U.S. Constitution was designed
to succeed: the Roman Constitution permitted the majority in the
assembly to trample the rights of individuals. The independent
judiciary embodied in the U.S. Constitution, at least according to most
non-popular constitutionalist accounts, is designed to protect
individuals and minorities from overreaching by the majority.
176
C. Marsilius of Padua
The medieval period-the epoch dating from the fall of the
Roman empire in the fifth century until the rise of national
monarchies, the start of European overseas exploration, the humanist
revival, and the Protestant Reformation-generally is regarded as a
dormant time in the history of separation of powers, at least as far as
political theorizing is concerned. Scott Gordon insists that, after
Polybius, Venetian Gasparo Contarini (1483-1542) was the next
political theorist of note, while M.J.C. Vile focuses on several theorists
active during the English Civil War.177 However, dismissing the
medieval period neglects the contributions of Marsilius of Padua
(1275-1342).178
Little is known about Marsilius's early life, other than that he
was rector of the University of Paris for a time. 79 He rose to
prominence when the Holy Roman Emperor Louis IV enlisted his
assistance in the Emperor's struggle with Pope John XXII over
whether the Emperor could rule without the Pope's approval.180 The
176. Cicero, the other prominent constitutional theorist of ancient Rome, did not articulate
the countervailing interpretation of the Roman Constitution as strongly as Polybius did, but he
appreciated the power of the plebeian tribunes to check the consuls. See CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA,
DE LEGIBUS 169 (C.W. Keyes trans., 1988) (51 B.C.).
177. GORDON, supra note 149, at 158; VILE, supra note 150, at 34.
178. Vile discusses Marsilius briefly. VILE, supra note 150, at 29-31. Gordon does not
mention him.
179. C. Kenneth Brampton, Marsiglio of Padua: Part I. Life, 37 ENG. HIST. REV. 501, 504
(1922).
180. See id. at 506-07.
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result was the publication, in 1324, of Marsilius's treatise Defensor
Pacis (The Defender of the Peace).""1 The treatise concludes that all
power is derived from the people; that the ruler is only the people's
delegate; that there is no law but the popular will, as expressed in the
ruler; that the church has no authority apart from the people; and
that the power of the Holy See is self-arrogated. 18
2
Marsilius frequently references Aristotle's Politics in Discourse
1 of Defensor Pacis, the portion of the treatise dedicated to describing
how government should be set up.18 3 (Discourse 2 is devoted to
criticizing the church, while Discourse 3 is a summary of the findings
of the first two discourses.18 4) As noted earlier, Aristotle's "best
regime" consists of rule by the virtuous; it can be either kingship (rule
by a supremely virtuous person) or aristocracy (rule by a group of
virtuous citizens).18 5 Marsilius, in contrast, argues for popular
sovereignty.18 6 It is unclear whether Marsilius wants the entire
citizenry to rule-a form of government that Aristotle criticizes-or
simply the aristocracy. Intellectual historian Otto Gierke concludes
that Marsilius prefers the entire citizenry to rule, while Alexander
Passerin D'Entreves maintains that Marsilius favors aristocratic
rule.18 7 The answer probably resides somewhere in the middle:
Marsilius's ideal state is one in which all citizens legislate. His
realistic state finds a smaller group representing the full citizenry.
With respect to the separation of powers, Alan Gewirth,
another leading authority on Marsilius's political philosophy,
maintains, as Gordon and Vile did years after him, that Marsilius is
not a separation of powers theorist. Gewirth writes:
For Marsilius, political authority is unilinear: it moves in a straight line from the
legislator, to the ruler who judges by authority of the legislator and thereby "executes"
the law, to the military or police which exercises compulsion ultimately through the
legislator's authority but immediately through the ruler's, and thereby itself "executes"
the ruler's judgments. For Montesquieu, on the other hand, political authority moves in
a circular direction, for each power-legislative, executive, judicial-is checked by the
others, and no one is ultimate in the sense of controlling the others while not being
controlled by them .... Marsilius' differentiation of the legislative and executive
181. Marsilius of Padua, in THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2007), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/65/malMarsiliu.html. See generally MARSILIUS OF PADUA, THE
DEFENDER OF THE PEACE (Annabel Brett ed. & trans., 2005) (1324).
182. MARSILIUS OF PADUA, supra note 181, at xxii-xxx.
183. Id. at 11-27, 30, 38-42, 45-50, 57-64, 66-70, 74-77, 83-95, 99-100, 105-07, 125-28, 135-36.
184. Id. at 139, 545.
185. See supra text accompanying note 125.
186. MARSILIUS OF PADUA, supra note 181, at 65-72.
187. ALEXANDER PASSERIN D'ENTREVES, THE MEDIEVAL CONTRIBUTION TO POLITICAL
THOUGHT 54-57 (1959); OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE 46-47 (Frederic
William Maitland trans., 1900).
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functions is not, then, a separation in radice but rather a utilitarian device of economy,
a division of labor for the sake of greater efficiency .... [T]his is only a methodological
principle, and is not given the status of an absolutely necessary condition of political
freedom such as Montesquieu makes of his separation of powers.
18 8
In my judgment, Gewirth fails to appreciate both the evolving
nature of separation of powers theory-from Aristotle's theory of
mixed government to John Adams's modifications of Montesquieu-
and the role Marsilius's most famous contribution to political theory-
the separation of church and state-plays in the development of the
theory. Given that this Article is devoted to exploring the development
of separation of powers theory, especially as it concerns the origins of
an independent judiciary, I will defer addressing Gewirth's first
oversight until later. It is appropriate to address his second oversight
now.
As is well known, religion dominated all spheres of medieval
life, including government. 8 9 However, Marsilius argues that no Pope
or other churchman possesses coercive power, let alone plenitude of
power. 190 In any state, there can be no more than one government,
which must be secular (as the clergy has no coercive power, and
government is coercive). 19' From the single secular government all
coercive power in the territory is derived. 192 This, of course, is the
doctrine of the separation of church and state, and Marsilius is
credited with originating it.193 But the doctrine has relevance for more
than matters of American First Amendment law, for Marsilius
presents his argument for the separation of church and state in
functional terms (specifically, that the function of government is to
keep peace on earth, while the role of the church is to prepare people
for the afterlife)l 94-a notable departure from Aristotle's class-based
taxonomy. 95 In fact, Marsilius also takes a functional approach to the
188. ALAN GEWIRTH, MARSILIUS OF PADUA AND MEDIEVAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 234-35
(1951).
189. See, e.g., James Russell Gordley, Law and Religion: An Imaginary Conversation with a
Medieval Jurist, 4 J.L. & RELIGION 193, 193 (1986) ("[Medievalists] lived in an Age of Faith while
we live in a secular society.").
190. GEWIRTH, supra note 188, at 275-76.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Gewirth argues that Marsilius can be read to fall on both sides of the church/state
divide: "[T]he Marsilian system, viewed in its totality, provides the considerations which in
modern times were to lead to the disestablished church and freedom of religion as well as to the
established church and politically enforced religion." Id. at 301-02.
194. Id. at 263.
195. See generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 536-37 (1983) (suggesting that the West's understanding of the
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allocation of government power: the ruler's responsibility is to execute
the laws enacted by the people. 196 And while Marsilius does not speak
directly to the independence of the judiciary-that would be left to
Montesquieu and John Adams, with early assistance from Sir John
Fortescue-the executive's function is judicial in nature, in that the
ruler's role is to apply a statement of the people's law to a particular
case.197
D. John Fortescue
Sir John Fortescue (1394-1476) was an English jurist and
political theorist who lived during the Renaissance, the historical age
that followed the medieval period. 198 He was Chief Justice of the Court
of the King's Bench from 1442-1461.199 He also served as justice of the
peace in twelve counties and on dozens of judicial commissions. 200 He
has been called "the most outstanding and original political writer in
England in the fifteenth century. '20 1 He wrote several books
examining the political theory of the English Constitution, De Natura
Legis Naturae, De Laudibus Legum Angliea, and Monarchia, or
Governance of England.20 2 Fortescue's judicial career almost certainly
explains why he emphasizes the judicial function in his description of
government power more than his predecessors did, and this emphasis
marks his contribution to the development of separation of powers
theory in general and to the political theory of an independent
judiciary in particular.
In his famous lectures on the history of constitutionalism,
political scientist Charles Howard McIlwain rejected the notion that
Fortescue contributed anything of consequence to modern separation
of powers theory. McIlwain asserted that "there is nothing in
Fortescue's words, or in the political institutions or ideas of the age he
describes, of our modern doctrine or practice of 'checks and balances.'
Government, so far as it was strictly government, was then a
separation of church and state was essential to the development of the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers).
196. GEWIRTH, supra note 188, at 168-69, 172.
197. Id. at 229-30.
198. H.J. Randall, Sir John Fortescue, 16 J. SOC'Y COMP. LEGIS. 248, 249-50 (1916).
199. Id.
200. ANTHONY GROSS, THE DISSOLUTION OF THE LANCASTRIAN KINGSHIP: SIR JOHN
FORTESCUE AND THE CRISIS OF MONARCHY IN FIFTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 70 (1996).
201. A.E. Levett, Sir John Fortescue, in THE SOCIAL & POLITICAL IDEAS OF SOME GREAT
THINKERS OF THE RENAISSANCE AND THE REFORMATION 61, 61-62 (F.J.C. Hearnshaw ed., 1949).
202. GROSS, supra note 200, at 41-43.
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discretionary power concentrated in a single hand."20 3 McIlwain is
incorrect. In fact, Fortescue anticipated Montesquieu, John Adams,
and the framers of the U.S. Constitution in recognizing a special role
for judges in a healthy constitutional regime.
Fortescue writes in support of what he calls a dominium
politicum et regale, a kingdom both political and royal that he believes
describes the England of his day.20 4 Note in the following passage
what Fortescue says about the role of judges in this mixed regime:
For in the kingdom of England the kings make not laws, nor impose subsidies upon
their subjects, without the consent of the three estates of the Realm. Nay, even the
Judges of that kingdom are all bound by their oaths not to render judgment against the
laws of the land, although they should have the command of the sovereign to the
contrary. 205
The uncommon emphasis Fortescue places on the judge's role is
not limited to his theoretical writings. In Thorpe's Case, a controversy
that concerned the imprisonment of the Speaker of the House of
Commons for alleged criminal acts, Fortescue declines, in the name of
all the judges of the King's Bench, to answer the House of Lords's
question about whether the speaker's imprisonment was legal.
206
Chief Justice Fortescue writes:
[T]hey [the judges] ought not to answer to that question; for it hath not been used
aforetime that the justices should in any wise determine the privilege of the High Court
of Parliament; for it is so high and mighty in its nature that it may make law, and the
determination and knowledge of that privilege belongeth to the Lords of the Parliament,
and not to the justices.
2 0 7
Fortescue is not arguing in either of the two quoted passages
for the independence of the judiciary in the American conception of the
institution. He plainly recognizes in the first passage that the courts
of law are the crown's, and in the second that Parliament, not the
judges, makes the law. Nevertheless, Fortescue's view of the courts is
significant in the development of the concept of judicial independence.
The first passage makes clear that Fortescue believes, as Sir Edward
Coke did after him,208 that the ruling institutions of England are
subject to the constraints of law, and that judges are charged with
203. CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, ANCIENT AND MODERN 92 (1940).
204. E.g., J.H. Burns, Fortescue and the Political Theory of Dominium, 28 HIST. J. 777, 780
(1985).
205. Levett, supra note 201, at 69 (quoting JOHN FORTESCUE, DE NATURA LEGIS NATURAE).
206. Id. at 81.
207. Id. (quoting Fortescue).
208. E.g., WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES: FROM LUTHER
TO MONTESQUIEU 205 (1905) (describing Fortescue's influence on Coke); JOHN MAXCY ZANE, THE
STORY OF LAW app. III (2d ed. 1998) (same).
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identifying what the law is.209 The second passage is an appreciation
of the fact that judicial power has limits-it is, in effect, an early
statement that judges have no constitutional authority to issue
advisory opinions. 210 In both passages, then, Fortescue addresses,
albeit briefly, the judiciary's role in a properly functioning
constitutional regime.
E. Gasparo Contarini
Gasparo Contarini, a sixteenth century Italian diplomat,
cardinal, and political theorist,211 was the next major figure in the
origins of modern separation of powers theory-and, hence, in the
political theory of an independent judiciary-because of his ability to
wed the concept of mixed government to the notion of checks and
balances among government institutions. Gordon credits Contarini as
a transformative figure in this regard:
The notion of mixed government did not, of itself, denote a system of dispersed power. In
its classical Greek formulation, the basic idea was that each of the pure forms of
government had certain inherent properties that could be preserved in a mixed polity:
the unity of the one, the wisdom of the few, and the liberty of the many. It is not a large
step from this perspective to view these properties as associated with different political
institutions, representing the three "elements." It is a much greater step to construe
these institutions as competing or mutually controlling centers of political power.
Indeed, the grafting of this notion onto the concept of mixed government had no logical
foundation. Nevertheless, it is clear from Gasparo Contarini's book on the government of
Venice that, by the mid-sixteenth century, this interpretation of mixed government had
begun to appear.
2 12
De magistratibus et republica Venetorium (The Commonwealth
and Government of Venice) was written in or about 1523 and
209. For Coke's statement, see Dr. Bonham's Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B.) ("In
many cases the common law will controul acts of Parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be
utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or
impossible to be performed, the common law will control it and adjudge such Act to be
void ... ").
210. For a similar statement from the U.S. Supreme Court, see Correspondence Between the
Justices of the Supreme Court and President Washington (Aug. 1793), in 3 CORRESPONDENCE
AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 488-89 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1893) ("There being in certain
respects checks upon each other, and our being judges of a court in the last resort, are
considerations which afford strong arguments against the propriety of our extra-judicially
deciding the questions alluded to .... ").
211. E.g., ELISABETH G. GLEASON, GASPARO CONTARINI: VENICE, ROME, AND REFORM ch. 1
(1993).
212. GORDON, supra note 149, at 221.
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published in 1543.213 Contarini's treatise is an amalgam of the actual
and the ideal: he describes Venice as it existed at the time of the
treatise and he suggests how it can regain its mythical status as the
perfect state.214 De magistratibus is divided into five books. Book 1
addresses the location and origins of Venice and its basic political
institution, the great council. 215 Book 2 focuses on the office of the doge
(i.e., the chief magistrate), 216 and Books 3 and 4 describe the senate,
the council of ten, and the savi (i.e., the heads of major executive
boards).217  Book 5 discusses the government of the Venetian
terraferma.
218
Contarini extols the confluence of the monarchic, aristocratic,
and democratic elements of the Venetian Constitution. He refers
frequently to Aristotle and Polybius in the treatise,219 but he also
compares the Constitution to the harmony of beautiful music. He
writes:
For as every mixture dissolves if any one of the elements (of which the mixed body is
composed) overcomes the others; and as in music the tune is marred where one string
keeps a greater note. By like reason, if you will have your commonwealth perfect and
enduring, let not one part be mightier than the other, but let them all (in as much as
they may be), have equal share in the public authority.
2 20
Contarini identifies the monarchical principle operating in the
doge; the aristocratic in the senate, the council of ten, and the savi;
and the democratic in the great council.221 The central, and original,
part of Contarini's analysis is his claim that no single element is able
to assume a dominant role in the government. 222 He sometimes
employs the language of a "mixed constitution," but he is actually
describing a system of checks and balances. According to Gordon, the
significance of the checks-and-balances character of Contarini's
analytical scheme "for the history of constitutional theory has yet to be
fully appreciated. ' 223 Historian Jutta Sperling agrees. She writes: "In
213. GLEASON, supra note 211, at 110-11. An English translation of Contarini's book is
available at GASPARO CONTARINI, THE COMMONWEALTH AND GOVERNMENT OF VENICE (Lewes
Lewkenor trans., 1599) (1543), http://dewey.library.upenn.edu/SCETI/PrintedBooksNew/
index.cfm?TextID=contarini&PagePosition=l.
214. GLEASON, supra note 211, at 113.
215. CONTARINI, supra note 213, at 1-36.
216. Id. at 37-63.
217. Id. at 64-125.
218. Id. at 125-49.
219. Id. at 11, 34, 39, 43, 64-65, 69-70, 138-39, 141.
220. Id. at 67.
221. GLEASON, supra note 211, at 116.
222. Id. at 117.
223. GORDON, supra note 149, at 161.
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struggling to apply Polybius's concept of a 'mixed constitution' to his
analysis of the political system of Venice, Gasparo Contarini was
among the first to formulate a new political rhetoric based on
conflating antagonisms."
224
Contarini, as Fortescue did before him, recognizes the
importance of the courts in a well-functioning regime. He points out
that, whereas the Romans left the prosecution of crime to private
citizens, Venice employs a public prosecutor:
225
In this matter our ancestors must be seen as having better imitated the nature of things
and more wisely provided for concord among the citizens than the Romans. For since
anyone who commits a crime primarily harms the laws and the Republic, he should
especially be punished by the Republic.
2 2 6
All of this said, Contarini was not Montesquieu, let alone John
Adams or John Marshall. His system continued to be class-based,
rather than function-specific. 227 He subscribed to the conventional
wisdom of his day that Venice's greatness was attributable to the
virtue of its patrician class. 228 Nobles had shaped the city; only they
were full citizens, and only they could be permitted to govern.
229
Because political office was the exclusive province of the nobility,
Contarini's political theory was limited to the democratic, oligarchic,
and monarchical elements within that class alone.230
F. Charles I
Charles I (1600-1649) was king of England, Scotland, and
Ireland from March 27, 1625, until his execution in 1649 for high
treason or, more specifically, for his purported efforts to wield absolute
power. 231 Although it might seem strange to credit a monarch
beheaded for tyranny as an influential figure in the origins of modern
separation of powers theory, Charles I merits this distinction, both for
224. Jutta Sperling, The Paradox of Perfection: Reproducing the Body Politic in Late
Renaissance Venice, 41 COMP. STUD. SOC'Y & HIST. 3, 15 (1999).
225. WILLIAM J. BouwSMA, VENICE AND THE DEFENSE OF REPUBLICAN LIBERTY:
RENAISSANCE VALUES IN THE AGE OF THE COUNTER REFORMATION 152 (1968).
226. Id. (translating GASPARO CONTARINI, THE COMMONWEALTH AND GOVERNMENT OF
VENICE (1543)) (internal citation omitted).
227. See GLEASON, supra note 211, at 114-16.
228. Id. at 114-15.
229. Id. at 115.
230. Id. at 114-17.
231. History of the Monarchy: Kings & Queens of the United Kingdom (from 1603), Charles
I, http://www.royal.gov.uk/output/Page76.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
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his political theorizing about the subject and for the reaction to his
theory.
The relations between King Charles and Parliament were
always strained, to put it mildly.232 Indeed, the House of Commons
was responsible for Charles's eventual execution.233 However, before
that fateful event, Parliament sent to the king Nineteen Propositions
articulating Parliament's constitutional opinions and desires.
234
Parliament demanded, among other concessions, that ministers in the
king's government and senior judges be subject to parliamentary
approval, that judges be afforded security of tenure, that members of
Parliament be immune from arrest, that the crown's prerogative not
include personal command of armed forces, and that privy councillors
and judges take an oath to support the principles of the Petition of
Right of 1628 (a statement of civil liberties sent by Parliament to
Charles) .235
King Charles's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions makes no
mention of the divine right of kings. 236 Instead, following Aristotle,
Charles identifies three principal forms of government, notes their
"conveniences and inconveniences," and declares England to be a
perfect amalgam of the three.237 He writes:
There being three kinds of government among men, absolute monarchy, aristocracy and
democracy, and all these having their particular conveniences and inconveniences, the
experience and wisdom of your ancestors hath so moulded this out of a mixture of these
as to give to this kingdom (as far as human prudence can provide) the conveniences of
all three, without the inconveniences of any one, as long as the balance hangs even
between the three estates.
2 3 8
Intellectual historian J.G.A. Pocock concludes that with these
words Charles I instituted a paradigm shift in Anglo-American
constitutional theory-from absolute rule by a monarch to mixed
government among checking and balancing political institutions.
239
Charles goes on in his Answer to insist that Parliament's existing
232. Id.
233. E.g., THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 27 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1977).
234. The Nineteen Propositions (June 1, 1642), reprinted in THE STUART CONSTITUTION,
1603-1688: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 222, 222-26 (J.P. Kenyon ed., 1986).
235. Id.
236. The King's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions (June 18, 1642), reprinted in THE
STUART CONSTITUTION, supra note 234, at 18-20.
237. Id. at 18.
238. Id.
239. THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON, supra note 233, at 20. See generally
CORINNE COMSTOCK WESTON, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND THE HOUSE OF LORDS,




authority is "sufficient to prevent and restrain the power of tyranny,"
and thereby declines to accede to Parliament's demands so as to
preserve the balance of England's "excellent constitution. '240
The practical consequence of King Charles's refusal to accept
Parliament's propositions was noted above: he was executed. The
significance of his theoretical account of the English Constitution as
the perfect mix of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy was the
virtually uncontested notion of the balanced constitution that
characterized English constitutional theory from the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 forward. In fact, the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries are widely regarded as the golden age of English political
theorizing about what, exactly, the balanced constitution was. 241 Two
English theorists merit brief mention here because of what they had to
say about the judiciary's role in this constitutional schema-a role
that Charles himself seemed to appreciate when he observed in his
Answer that "the Lords, being trusted with a judicatory power, are an
excellent screen and bank between the prince and people, to assist
each against any encroachment of the other, and by just judgments to
preserve that law which ought to be the rule of every one of the
three . "242
Most of the seventeenth and eighteenth century English
separation of powers theorists focused on the separation of executive
and legislative functions. John Locke was, of course, the most notable
theorist of this type.243 The judicial function was considered a part of
the executive power. Although it had been recognized since the
writings of Sir John Fortescue that the judicial power was in some
sense different from the other powers of government, 244 the view that
240. The King's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions, supra note 236, at 19.
241. See generally W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 23-
27 (1965) (discussing mixed government's re-emergence as a prominent currency of European
political thought); VILE, supra note 150, at 43-82 (exploring the boundaries and meaning of the
balanced constitution). The Act of Settlement of 1701 was enacted during this period. It specified
the line of succession to the throne and, most important for present purposes, established that
English judges were to enjoy life tenure during good behavior. 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, § 3 (Eng.).
242. The King's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions, supra note 236, at 19.
243. On whether Locke, given his commitment to legislative supremacy, was a separation of
powers theorist at all, see GWYN, supra note 241, at 66-81.
244. Sir Edward Coke echoed Fortescue's position on a number of occasions, including in a
1607 statement:
[T]hat the King in his own person cannot adjudge any case, either criminal, as
treason, felony, etc., or betwixt party and party, concerning his inheritance, chattels,
or goods, etc., but this ought to be determined and adjudged in some court of justice
according to the law and custom of England.
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there were three separate powers of government emerged during the
English Civil War, which began during the reign of Charles I and
ended when Charles II ascended to the throne in the Restoration of
1660.245 The clearest expressions during this period of the distinct
nature of the judicial power are found in Charles Dallison's The
Royalists Defence (1648) and John Sadler's Rights of the Kingdom
(1649).246 The thesis of Dallison's work anticipated the "celebrated"247
Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws, discussed below, by one
hundred years: a proper government was one in which the three
functions of government were in separate hands so that "every one is
limited, and kept within his owne bounds. '248 Dallison insisted that
neither the crown nor Parliament had the authority to judge the
laws-that was the responsibility of "the office of the Judges of the
Realme." 249 Parliament's function was "only to make new laws,"25 0 and
the crown was "our onely Supream Governour. 251
A year later, John Sadler expressed a similar view. He wrote:
For, if Lawmakers, be Judges, of Those that break their Laws; they seem to judg in their
Own Causes: Which our Law, and Nature it self, so much avoydeth and abhorreth. So it
seemeth also to forbid, both the Lawmaker, and the Judg, to Execute: & by express Act
of Parliament, it is provided, that Sheriffs be not Justices, where they be Sheriffs ....
And besides All that was said before; This seemeth One Reason, why our Ancestors did
so willingly follow the Voyce of Nature; in placing the Power Legislative, Iudiciall, &
Executive, in 3 distinct Estates; (as in Animals, Aerials, Etherials, or Celestials, 3
regions; and 3 Principles in Naturals:) that so, they might be forced to Consult Often,
and Much; in All they did.
2 5 2
G. Baron de Montesquieu
Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brede et de
Montesquieu (1689-1755), a French noble, jurist, and political
Id. at 6. Coke's focus in the quoted passage is on matters in which the crown is a party. (George
Buchanan and Richard Hooker anticipated this position in the sixteenth century. VILE, supra
note 150, at 34.) Coke's opinion in Dr. Bonham's Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B.), is an
illustration of his commitment to the more expansive view expressed by Fortescue during the
fifteenth century.
245. VILE, supra note 150, at 34.
246. CHARLES DALLISON, THE ROYALISTS DEFENCE (1648); JOHN SADLER, RIGHTS OF THE
KINGDOM; OR, CUSTOMS OF OUR ANCESTOURS (1649). Vile emphasizes Dallison and Gwyn
stresses Sadler. VILE, supra note 150, at 50-52; GWYN, supra note 241, at 54-56.
247. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 86, at 301.
248. DALLISON, supra note 246, at 126.
249. Id. at 47-48.
250. Id. at 56.
251. Id. at 60.
252. SADLER, supra note 246, at 87, 92.
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philosopher, was the author of two influential books: The Persian
Letters (1721), a novel that established his literary reputation, and
The Spirit of the Laws (1748), a seminal work of political science that
is universally regarded as playing a pivotal role in the development of
modern separation of powers theory.
253
By "The Spirit of the Laws" (in the original French, "De l'esprit
des lois"),254 Montesquieu means the rational basis for the existence of
laws. The work's objective is to explain human laws and social
institutions, and the author's methodology is largely sociological. 255 He
concludes that the type of government that exists in a particular
regime is the result of the specific circumstances of that regime, both
physical (e.g., climate, geography) and social (e.g., mores, religion).
256
He identifies as the main species of government the republic (either
democratic or aristocratic), monarchy, and despotism. 257 He claims
that each form of government has an animating principle-a set of
"human passions that set it in motion"-and that each form can be
corrupted if its animating principle is undermined. 258 In his analysis
of the one government that had liberty as its animating principle-
England-Montesquieu penned one of the most famous passages in
the history of political ideas:
When legislative power is united with executive power in a single person or in a single
body of the magistracy, there is no liberty, because one can fear that same monarch or
senate that makes tyrannical laws will execute them tyrannically. Nor is there liberty if
the power of judging is not separate from legislative power and from executive power. If
it were joined to legislative power, the power over the life and liberty of the citizens
would be arbitrary, for the judge would be the legislator. If it were joined to executive
power, the judge could have the force of an oppressor. All would be lost if the same man
or the same body of principal men, either of nobles, or of the people, exercised these
three powers: that of making the laws, that of executing public resolutions, and that of
judging the crimes or the disputes of individuals.
25 9
253. M. DE MONTESQUIEU, PERSIAN LETTERS (Mr. Flloyd trans., 4th ed. 1792) (1721); M. DE
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., 1989) (1748). Vile
insists that Montesquieu's influence cannot be attributed to any "originality" on his part, but
rather to the "manner and timing of the doctrine's development in his hands." VILE, supra note
150, at 83. Vile contends that the "fertile ground" of the British colonies in North America was
largely responsible for Montesquieu's subsequent acclaim. Id. at 85.
254. All translations in this Section are from MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra
note 253.
255. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) is regarded as the founder of modern sociology, but
Montesquieu's methodology in The Spirit of the Laws, which preceded Spencer's work, is
unquestionably sociological. See generally MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note
253; HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS (1851).
256. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 253, at 7-9.
257. Id. at 10.
258. Id. at 21, 30.
259. Id. at 157.
1110
HISTORY OF IDEAS
Perhaps the best way to understand Montesquieu's schema is
to compare it to Aristotle's analysis of government powers. 260 As
described earlier, Aristotle writes of the deliberative, magistrative,
and judicial functions of government. 261 The deliberative function
covers important common affairs, including war and peace,
lawmaking, appointing magistrates, and the adjudication of major
crimes. The magistrative function concerns the issuance of
instructions and orders in more limited areas, including strategy and
finance. The judicial function involves adjudicating disputes that are
not major crimes. Aristotle does not distribute the legislative,
executive, and judicial powers of government among different people,
as his deliberative function indicates. Of course the distribution of
legislative, executive, and judicial powers is at the heart of
Montesquieu's theory for safeguarding liberty. Indeed, as the above-
quoted passage makes clear, it is Montesquieu's theory.
This said, Montesquieu's characterization of government power
is not the same as that embodied in the U.S. Constitution, despite the
conventional wisdom to the contrary.262 The preferred system of
checks and balances that Montesquieu describes in The Spirit of the
Laws is not the three famous powers-legislative, executive, and
judicial-but the established English scheme of king, lords, and
commons. 263 He writes: "Among the three powers of which we have
spoken that of judging is in some fashion, null."264 He maintains that
"only two" powers truly matter-the legislative and the executive-
and that the "part of the legislative body composed of the nobles is
quite appropriate" for checking legislative abuse.265
Likewise overlooked is that Montesquieu identifies the judicial
power-"that of judging the crimes or the disputes of individuals"-
with petit juries, rather than with a judge in a robe. 266 "In England,"
Montesquieu proclaims in a much-neglected passage, "the jury decides
whether the accused is guilty or not of the deed brought before it; and,
260. David Lowenthal, Montesquieu, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 513, 523 (Leo
Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987).
261. For the relevant text, see supra Part II.A.
262. For expressions of the conventional wisdom, see SAMUEL KERNELL & GARY C.
JACOBSON, THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 51 (3rd ed. 2006); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 149 (7th ed. 2004).
263. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 253, at 160.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 157.
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if he is declared guilty, the judge pronounces the penalty imposed by
law for this deed; and he needs only his eyes for that.
'267
Although Montesquieu did not afford the judiciary the
independent status that it eventually would enjoy in the United
States, he did contribute more to the political theory of an
independent judiciary than the preceding paragraphs might suggest.
In fact, Vile argues that Montesquieu's treatment of the judicial power
is where his "greatest innovatory importance lies."268 First and
foremost, Montesquieu placed the judicial power on analytical par
with the legislative power and the executive power, and he likewise
emphasized the trinity of the branches of government. Theorists,
including the American founders, almost always benefit from
analytical categorization. Montesquieu also insisted that judges-
again, he meant petit juries-should interpret the law, rather than
make it: "it is in the nature of the constitution for judges to follow the
letter of the law. No law can be interpreted to the detriment of a
citizen when it is a question of his goods, his honor, or his life."
269
Similarly, Montesquieu recognized that due process was at the heart
of the judicial power and essential to liberty itself:
If you examine the formalities of justice in relation to the difficulties a citizen endures to
have his goods returned to him or to obtain satisfaction for some insult, you will
doubtless find the formalities too many; if you consider them in their relation to the
liberty and security of the citizens, you will often find them too few, and you will see
that the penalties, expenses, delays, and even the dangers of justice are the price each
citizen pays for his liberty.
2 70
Finally, Montesquieu objected vigorously to the notion that executive
officials (in England, royal ministers) should sit as judges because




John Adams (1735-1826) of Massachusetts-a leader of the
American Revolution, an influential diplomat, the Vice President of
the United States under George Washington, and the successor to
Washington as President of the United States-was the American
267. Id. at 76.
268. VILE, supra note 150, at 96.
269. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 253, at 76.
270. Id. at 74.
271. Id. at 80. Of course England is not America, and the judicial power continues to be
wielded by the upper house of the English legislature in a manner that the Federal Constitution
of 1787 would not permit (i.e., the House of Lords is the highest court in the land).
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founding's most sophisticated political theorist.272 Adams's most
systematic work on government was the three-volume treatise, A
Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of
America, published in 1787.273 A dramatic departure from his earlier
writings, it extolled the English theory of a balanced constitution and
was criticized by James Madison for being out of touch with the
constitutional thinking of the day.274 But no theoretical writing on
political architecture penned by an American founder was more
influential than Adams's 1776 pamphlet, Thoughts on Government.275
Indeed, Thoughts on Government was to be the final step in the
political theory of an independent judiciary eventually embodied in
Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 276
Adams had been writing about the need for an independent
judiciary since at least January and February of 1773, when he
engaged in a series of exchanges on the matter in the Boston press
with William Brattle. 277 Brattle, a Tory, insisted that proposed
payment of judicial salaries by the crown should not concern the
people of Massachusetts Bay, as the judges of the colony's superior
court, like their brethren in England, enjoyed tenure so long as they
behaved well. Adams, after conducting an extensive historical review
of the subject, countered that Brattle was wrong to suggest that
judges in England, let alone in America, held their offices during good
behavior. Consequently, Adams perceived the crown's proposed control
over judicial salaries as an additional threat to the independence of
the Massachusetts judiciary.
272. E.g., C. BRADLEY THOMPSON, JOHN ADAMS AND THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY xii-xix (1998);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 567-69 (1969). See
generally DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS (2001).
273. JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (1971) (1787).
274. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 6, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 28, 29-30 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977).
275. JOHN ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT (1776), reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 193, 193-200 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851). For commentary on the work's influence,
see MCCULLOUGH, supra note 272, at 101-03; THOMPSON, supra note 272, at 298 n.8; WOOD,
supra note 272, at 568.
276. Sir William Blackstone anticipated Adams on the importance of independent and
professional judges, rather than ad hoc juries, to the preservation of liberty. WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 259-60 (Stanley Nader Katz ed., 1979)
(1765-69). However, Blackstone, unlike Adams, was strongly committed to the doctrine of
legislative supremacy. Id. at 91.
277. The letters are available in THE PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS VOLUME 1: SEPTEMBER 1755-
OCTOBER 1773, at 252-309 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1977).
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Adams revisited the matter of an independent judiciary in
Thoughts on Government.278  The pamphlet-a clarion call for
separation of powers written in response to Thomas Paine's
recommendation in Common Sense that all government power be
vested in a unicameral legislature-was influential in a number of
state constitutional conventions beyond Massachusetts, including
those in New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and Virginia.279
Adams maintains that the pamphlet was inspired by a number of the
great political theorists of his day, specifically by Harrington, Sydney,
Hobbes, Nedham, and Locke. 280 (Surprisingly, no mention is made of
Montesquieu, although Adams does discuss him in A Defence of the
Constitutions of Government of the United States of America.)
281
Adams argues in Thoughts on Government for a bicameral
legislature: a representative assembly, "an exact portrait in miniature
of the people at large," and a smaller "council" chosen by the assembly
and designed to "check and correct [the assembly's] errors. '282 The
executive, the "governor," should be chosen by the two houses of the
legislature on an annual basis, and he should be endowed with the
authority to veto legislation. 28 3 Most important of all, as far as the
political theory of an independent judiciary is concerned, Adams
explains in no uncertain terms the significance of judicial
independence to any form of government dedicated to the preservation
of liberty. He writes:
The dignity and stability of government in all its branches, the morals of the people, and
every blessing of society depend so much upon an upright and skillful administration of
justice, that the judicial power ought to be distinct from both the legislative and
executive, and independent upon both, that so it may be a check upon both, as both
should be checks upon that.
2 8 4
278. ADAMS, supra note 275.
279. E.g., JOHN ADAMS, Autobiography of John Adams, in 3 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
JOHN ADAMS 330-35 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1961). Adams wrote several versions of the pamphlet.
He also pushed through the Continental Congress in May of 1776 a resolution urging that states
adopt frames of government to facilitate the transition to independence. The resolution
recommended
to the respective Assemblies and Conventions of the United Colonies, where no
government sufficient to the exigencies of their affairs hath been hitherto established,
to adopt such government as shall, in the opinion of the representatives of the people,
best conduce to the happiness and safety of their constituents in particular, and
America in general.
2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 275, at 489.
280. ADAMS, supra note 275, at 194.
281. ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 273, at 153-58.
282. ADAMS, supra note 275, at 195.
283. Id. at 196-97.
284. Id. at 198.
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Adams thus recommends that judges be "nominated and appointed by
the governor, with the advice and consent of council." 28 5 However, he
argues for more than merely making the judiciary a separate branch
of government. He calls for stable judicial compensation and tenure so
long as judges behave well: "[T]hey should hold estates for life in their
offices; or, in other words, their commissions should be during good
behavior, and their salaries ascertained and established by law."28 6 He
also insists that judges who misuse their offices should be impeached
by the "house of representatives ... before the governor and council"
and, "if convicted, should be removed."
28 7
The Federal Constitution of 1787 excluded the executive from
the impeachment process, but otherwise contained principles identical
to Adams's proposal. Article III, Section 1, provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
2 8 8
As David McCullough puts it in his Pulitzer Prize winning biography
of John Adams, "[]ittle that Adams ever wrote had such effect as his
Thoughts on Government.28 9
III. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS
A. Judicial Independence and Judicial Review
Government institutions do not spring fully formed from the
pen of constitutional framers like Athena from the brow of Zeus. They
develop over time, and they are shaped by political theorists. The
judicial institution embodied in the U.S. Constitution is no different.
Part II of this Article argued that the political theory of an
independent judiciary is the culmination of the work of eight political
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 198-99.
288. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
289. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 272, at 103. Adams was in Europe on a diplomatic mission
during the Federal Convention of 1787. However, as Zoltan Haraszti concludes in his classic
study of Adams's bibliographic influences, Adams "exerted an enormous influence on the debates
of the Federal Convention." ZOLTAN HARASZTI, JOHN ADAMS & THE PROPHETS OF PROGRESS 31
(1952). Adams's extensive personal library contained the works of the political theorists who
preceded him. Id. at ch. 2.
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theorists writing over the span of twenty-two centuries, with each
building on the contributions of the others. It all began with Aristotle's
theory of a mixed constitution, a theory that divided government into
three parts, with each part representing a political class of the regime.
Next came Polybius, who emphasized the checking and balancing of
government power, albeit power still divided along class, rather than
institutional, lines. Marsilius of Padua was the initial political theorist
to focus on the function of particular institutions, while Sir John
Fortescue was the first to appreciate the unique role of the judiciary.
Gasparo Contarini was responsible for marrying the Aristotelian
theory of mixed government to the concept of checks and balances, and
Charles I took the pivotal step of committing Anglo-American
constitutional theory to the notion of balance among political
institutions, rather than dominance by one. Montesquieu contributed
the most famous idea of all: that political power should be divided
among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government
so as to ensure the people's liberty. Finally, John Adams argued that
judges, and not simply temporary juries (as Montesquieu had argued),
need to be independent from the executive and legislative branches,
and that this independence would be possible only if judges were
afforded tenure so long as they behaved well and were paid adequate
and stable salaries. In sum, although political architecture is not
solely the provenance of political theorists, without political theory
America's constitutional framers could not have used the lessons of
history to create a judicial branch whose independence plays such an
essential role in the preservation of freedom.
But where does judicial review-the object of popular
constitutionalists' ire-fit into the political theory of an independent
judiciary explored in Part II? The answer is not difficult to explain.
First, as Part I.C described, without judicial review the Supreme
Court would have no "constitutional control" over the President and
Congress. 290 As a consequence, judicial review is an inevitable
component of the Constitution's commitment to checks and balances.
To make the point somewhat differently, while most scholars
emphasize what might be called the "vertical" origins of judicial
review-the notion that there exists a hierarchy of laws and that
when a court finds an inferior law repugnant to a superior law, it
ought to invalidate the inferior law291-an investigation into the
origins of judicial review that takes seriously the history of ideas
reveals that the doctrine's genesis is more accurately traced to the
290. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 86, at 308.
291. Eg., Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, supra note 71.
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"horizontal" idea of separation of powers. Second, judicial review is the
ultimate expression of judicial independence, because without judicial
independence no court could safely void an act of a coordinate political
branch. Bluntly stated, the risk to a judge who exercises judicial
review when he is not independent of the executive and the legislature
is either removal from the bench or a reduction in salary. John Adams
knew this, and so did the framers who met in Philadelphia during the
summer of 1787 when they wrote Adams's theory of judicial
independence into Article III.
B. Judicial Review and Individual Rights
Equally important, the political theory of an independent
judiciary likewise suggests how judicial review should be exercised: to
protect individual rights from "the people themselves." An
examination of the handful of pre-Federal Constitution precedents for
judicial review makes plain that early American lawyers and judges
understood this, and popular constitutionalists need to understand it
today. Given the present Article's focus on political development, the
analysis of the pre-Federal Constitution precedents will not be
confined to cases in which a court declared an executive or legislative
act unconstitutional. It also will examine cases in which a court was
asked to do so, or considered doing so, but ultimately did not.2 92
The first recorded statement of judicial review in America is
generally thought to have been made by James Otis before the
Massachusetts Superior Court in 1761 in the famous writs of
assistance case, Paxton v. Gray.293 According to a young John Adams,
292. William Michael Treanor claims to have located "more than six times as many cases [of
judicial review] from the early Republic as the leading historical account found." William Michael
Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 455 (2005). Sylvia Snowiss, the
author of that leading historical account, found five pre-Marbury precedents for judicial review.
SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1990). However,
Treanor fails to consider the early cases in which a court was asked to exercise judicial review, or
considered doing so, but ultimately did not. This oversight causes him to misunderstand how
judicial review was expected to be practiced. He insists that the original understanding of
judicial review was to protect the structural integrity of the judicial process and the national
political process, rather than iundividual rights. Akhil Reed Amar appears to agree with Treanor's
conception of the original understanding of judicial review but, in an otherwise intriguing
discourse on America's Constitution, he too neglects to consider cases in which a court was asked
to exercise judicial review, or considered exercising it, but declined. See AKHiL REED AMAR,
AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 212-13 (2005).
293. For the relevant facts of the case, see James Otis, Speech on the Writs of Assistance
(Feb. 24, 1761), in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 275, at 521-24. For compelling
discussions of two earlier cases, both from South Carolina, see JAMES LOWELL UNDERWOOD, THE
CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA: VOLUME I: THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE LEGISLATIVE,
EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES 30, 147-48 (1986), which discusses Dymes v. Ness (1724),
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who chronicled the case, in dispute was a request by the royal customs
office that the court issue general search warrants, or writs of
assistance, because particular search warrants had proved ineffective
in the customs office's efforts to curb smuggling. Nothing was more
repugnant to the colonists' conception of individual rights than
general searches, violating as they did the cherished maxim that "a
man's house is his castle." Otis was so strongly opposed to the idea of
general search warrants that he not only refused to argue the case on
behalf of the customs office, as was his charge as the king's advocate
in the province, but he decided to represent the local merchants
instead. Significantly, Otis's argument against the general search
warrants centered on the power of a court to void legislation that
conflicts with the constitution. In Otis's words: "As to acts of
Parliament. An act against the Constitution is void; an act against
natural equity is void; and if the act of Parliament should be made, in
the very words of the Petition, it would be void. The executive Courts
must pass such acts into disuse."
When Otis argued the writs of assistance case, the doctrine of
legislative supremacy held sway. It therefore should come as no
surprise that he lost the case. This fact notwithstanding, Otis's
argument for judicial review as a means for protecting individual
rights was a milestone in American history, portending as it did
events to come. According to Adams, Otis's argument about the
unenforceability of legislative acts that contravene constitutional
rights was so influential that with it "the child of independence was
born."
2 9 4
Robin v. Hardaway (1772) is another noteworthy pre-
Revolution case that illustrates that the principal purpose of judicial
review is to protect individual rights.295 In that case, George Mason,
an influential Virginia lawyer who later opposed the ratification of the
Federal Constitution because it did not contain a bill of rights, argued
that a 1682 Virginia law giving slave traders the right to sell the
descendants of Native Americans as slaves violated the Native
Americans' natural rights-the philosophical foundation for individual
rights in classical liberal political theory-and was, therefore, void.296
In Mason's words:
and Robert Cook, Judicial Review and Legislative Power, in SOUTH CAROLINA LEGAL HISTORY
81, 83-96 (Herbert A. Johnson ed., 1980), which discusses Rex v. Mellichamp (1736). Historians
likely will discover still more precedents in future research.
294. Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (Mar. 29, 1817), in 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS, supra note 275, at 248.
295. 1 Jeff. 109 (Va. 1772).
296. Id. at 113.
1118 [Vol. 61:4:1067
HISTORY OF IDEAS
[A]ll acts of the legislature apparently contrary to natural right and justice, are, in our
laws, and must be in the nature of things, considered as void. The laws of nature are the
laws of God; whose authority can be superseded by no power on earth. A legislature
must not obstruct our obedience to him from those whose punishments they cannot
protect us. All human constitutions which contradict his laws, we are in conscience
bound to disobey. Such have been the adjudications of our courts of justice.
2 9 7
A forceful advocate, Mason no doubt overstated the frequency
with which judges in 1772 were striking down legislation they deemed
violative of higher law. In fact, the judges in Robin v. Hardaway
worked hard to avoid commenting on the legitimacy of the statute in
question. In a maneuver reflective of the still widespread commitment
to legislative supremacy, 298 the judges concluded that the statute had
been repealed in 1705.299 They were not, therefore, required to assess
the statute's constitutionality as Mason had requested.
300
Nevertheless, Mason's argument, like Otis's before it, was
representative of the bar's growing willingness to challenge legislative
power that infringed on individual rights by invoking the power of a
court to curb it.
This trend continued after the colonists declared independence.
For example, in Commonwealth v. Caton, the Virginia Court of
Appeals, the state's highest tribunal, addressed the constitutionality
of a 1776 Virginia statute that moved the pardon power from the
executive to the legislature. 30 1 The statute was before the Virginia
court because a dispute arose when the lower legislative house
pardoned three men condemned to death for treason, and the upper
house refused to concur. The Attorney General, seeking to enforce the
death sentences, insisted that the pardons were ineffective because
the statute required the assent of both legislative houses. The
condemned men disagreed, arguing that the statute granted the
pardoning power to the lower house alone or it was unconstitutional.
The judges sided with the Attorney General. More significantly, they
held that they had the power to strike down laws that violated the
Constitution. Although individual rights were at stake-the
condemned men's right not to be killed-Caton was chiefly about the
allocation of governmental power: specifically, about where the pardon
power resided. Nevertheless, Judge George Wythe's opinion in the
297. Id. at 114.
298. Colonel Bland, arguing the case for the defendants, emphasized legislative supremacy.
Id. at 118.
299. Id. at 123.
300. Id.
301. For the relevant facts of the case, see 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 5-8 (Va. 1782).
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case reveals that these early judges were well versed in political
theory generally and in separation of powers theory specifically:
Among all the advantages, which have arisen to mankind, from the study of letters, and
the universal diffusion of knowledge, there is none of more importance, than the
tendency they have had to produce discussions upon the respective rights of the
sovereign and the subject; and, upon the powers which the different branches of
government may exercise. For, by this means, tyranny has been sapped, the
departments kept within their own spheres, the citizens protected, and general liberty
promoted.
3 0 2
Judge Wythe, who was John Marshall's law teacher, also
indicated that it is a judge's responsibility to check overreaching by
the political branches. He wrote:
[I]f the whole legislature, an event to be deprecated, should attempt to overleap the
bounds, prescribed to them by the people, I, in administering the public justice of this
country, will meet the united powers, at my seat in this tribunal; and, pointing to the
constitution, will say, to them, here is the limit of your authority; and hither, shall you
go, but no further.
3 0 3
One of the most intriguing of the early state court cases is
Rutgers v. Waddington, argued by Alexander Hamilton. 3 4 At issue
was whether Hamilton's client, a British citizen named Joshua
Waddington, committed a trespass by occupying plaintiff Elizabeth
Rutger's property during the American Revolution. Rutgers sued
Waddington pursuant to a New York statute that entitled any person
who vacated his or her property under threat of the war to recover in
trespass against any person who occupied or destroyed the property.
Hamilton, like Otis and Mason before him, emphasized in his
argument the need for the judiciary to protect his client's individual
rights: "The enemy having a right to the use of the Plaintiffs property
& having exercised their right through the Defendant & for valuable
consideration he cannot be made answerable to another without
injustice and a violation of the law of Universal society.30 5
The court was fully aware of the thrust of Hamilton's
argument. The judges noted that Hamilton's defense centered on the
claim that "statutes against law and reason are void. '30 6 And the court
appeared to accept Hamilton's position:
[]e profess to revere the rights of human nature; at every hazard and expence we have
vindicated, and successfully established them in our land! and we cannot but reverence
302. Id. at 7.
303. Id. at 8.
304. For the relevant facts of the case, see 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON:
DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 393-419 (Julius Goebel Jr. ed., 1964).
305. Id. at 373.
306. Id. at 395.
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a law which is their chief guardian-a law which inculcates as a first principle-that the
amiable precepts of the law of nature, are as obligatory on nations in their mutual
intercourse, as they are on individuals in their conduct towards each other; and that
every nation is bound to contribute all in its powers to the happiness and perfection of
others!
3 0 7
But despite this strong language about the importance of
protecting individual rights, the court upheld the statute, explicitly
acknowledging the supremacy of the legislature. 308 The court did,
however, deny the plaintiff relief.309 The court's inconsistent actions
suggest that the judges were torn between their increasing awareness
of the need for judges to protect individual rights and their lingering
commitment to the doctrine of legislative supremacy.
In a Connecticut decision the following year, such inconsistency
was conspicuously absent. The Symsbury Case involved a land dispute
between two neighboring towns. 310 Originally, title to a plot of land
was held by the town of Symsbury. Subsequently, the town of New
Hartford performed a survey and found that the land was located
within its town limits. The state legislature agreed and granted title
to New Hartford. The proprietors of Symsbury sued, demanding that
title be returned to them. The court ruled in favor of Symsbury. In the
court's judgment, the act of the state legislature granting title to New
Hartford "could not legally operate to curtail the land before granted
to the proprietors of the town of Symsbury, without their consent."
Brief though it is, the court's decision in the Symsbury Case is
important for two related reasons. First, the decision is plainly an
early example of judicial review. Second, the decision is further
evidence of a growing awareness among judges that they must serve
as a check against legislative power when individual rights-such as
the right to property-are at stake.
Trevett v. Weeden is another landmark case in the development
of judicial review. As is so often true of cases from the early days of the
American Republic, the opinion of the court has not been found.
However, a widely read account of the case by James Varnum, the
lead defense attorney, is available. 311 At issue was a controversial
Rhode Island statute that required local merchants to accept paper
money as legal tender-a requirement that, given the inflationary
307. Id. at 400.
308. Id. at 415.
309. Id. at 419.
310. For the relevant facts of the case, see 1 Kirby 444, 444-47 (Conn. 1785).
311. JAMES M. VARNUM, THE CASE, TREVETT AGAINST WEEDEN: ON INFORMATION AND
COMPLAINT, FOR REFUSING PAPER BILLS IN PAYMENT FOR BUTCHER'S MEAT, IN MARKET, AT PAR
WITH SPECIE (1787). The discussion of the case is drawn from id. at 1-2, 11, 27, 35.
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pressures of the day, the merchants opposed. Merchants who refused
to accept paper money were subject to arrest and to trial without the
benefit of a jury. Varnum's client was one such merchant.
Varnum made a variety of arguments in defense of his client
but, according to Varnum himself, "by far the most important" was a
direct challenge to the statute's constitutionality. Varnum claimed
both that the statute was unconstitutional and that the judges must
declare it so:
The true distinction lies in this, that the legislative have the uncontrollable power of
making laws not repugnant to the constitution; the judiciary have the sole power of
judging of those laws, and are bound to execute them; but cannot admit any act of the
legislative as law, which is against the constitution.
Just as important as Varnum's comments about the existence
of the power of judicial review was his argument about how that
power should be exercised: to protect individual rights. Varnum's
substantive attack on the statute was that trial by jury is an
"unalienable right" that the legislature cannot justly infringe, and his
argument to the court was replete with references to the sanctity of
individual rights and to the fact that the American regime was
founded to secure them.
Unfortunately, because the court's opinion has not been found,
the court's reaction to Varnum's argument is somewhat unclear.
Newspaper reports suggest that most judges were receptive to
Varnum's position. Resolutions passed by the Rhode Island legislature
condemning the judges' handling of the case provide additional
evidence of this fact.3
12
The most famous of the pre-Federal Constitution precedents for
judicial review is Bayard v. Singleton.313 Like most states during the
American Revolution, North Carolina confiscated property held by
individuals who remained loyal to the British. At issue in the case was
a statute that required judges to dismiss, without regard to merit, any
action brought by an individual seeking to recover title to confiscated
property. In a short opinion, the North Carolina Court of Conference-
the predecessor to the North Carolina Supreme Court-unanimously
declared the statute unconstitutional on the ground that an individual
seeking to recover title to confiscated property was entitled to a jury
trial on the merits of his claim.
312. E.g., IRWIN H. POLISHOOK, RHODE ISLAND AND THE UNION: 1774-1795, at 133-42 (1969).
313. For the relevant facts of the case, see 1 N.C. 5, 5-10 (1787).
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The court undoubtedly was influenced by a widely discussed
letter "To the Public," published in a local newspaper. 314 The letter
was written by James Iredell, the plaintiffs co-counsel and a future
member of the pre-Marbury U.S. Supreme Court. Iredell emphasized
the need to curb the legislature, and he did so by drawing on the
lessons of the American Revolution. He wrote:
It was, of course, to be considered how to impose restrictions on the legislature, that
might still leave it free to all useful purposes, but at the same time guard against the
abuse of unlimited power, which was not to be trusted, without the most imminent
danger, to any man or body of men on earth. We had not only been sickened and
disgusted for years with the high and almost impious language from Great Britain, of
the omnipotent power of the British Parliament, but had severely smarted under its
effects. We felt in all its rigor the mischiefs of an absolute and unbounded authority,
claimed by so weak a creature as man, and should have been guilty of the basest breach
of trust, as well as the grossest folly, if the moment when we spurned at the insolent
despotism of Great Britain, we had established a despotic power among ourselves.
3 15
After the court's decision declaring the confiscation statute
unconstitutional-the direct check on legislative overreaching on
individual rights for which Iredell had argued-Richard Dobbs
Spaight, then serving as a North Carolina delegate to the
constitutional convention in Philadelphia, wrote a letter to Iredell
severely criticizing him for encouraging the court to engage in such a
"usurpation" of power. 316 Iredell held his ground. He responded to
Spaight in a letter that expanded on his earlier letter "To the Public."
Specifically, Iredell insisted that judicial review was necessary
because, without it, individual rights such as the right to property
would not be adequately protected.
317
Last but far from least, I recently uncovered a non-judicial
precedent for judicial review that is consistent with the judicial
precedents discussed in this Section. That precedent is a July 25,
1781, objection by Governor Thomas Burke of North Carolina to a
court bill that would have created a special treason tribunal
"composed of persons chosen at the Will and Pleasure of the Governor
and altogether dependent on him and the General Assembly. 318
Governor Burke insisted that such a bill violated the 1776 North
314. James Iredell, To the Public (Aug. 17, 1786), in 2 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES
IREDELL 145 (Griffith J. McRee ed., 1858).
315. Id. at 145-46.
316. Letter from Richard Dobbs Spaight to James Iredell (Aug. 12, 1787), in 2 LIFE AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL, supra note 314, at 169-70.
317. Letter from James Iredell to Richard Dobbs Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), in 2 LIFE AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL, supra note 314, at 172.
318. Thomas Burke, Questions and Propositions by the Governor (July 25, 1781), in 19 THE
STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 862-63 (Walter Clark ed., 1901).
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Carolina Declaration of Rights provision that required the judiciary to
be a separate and independent branch of the North Carolina
government. 319 In short, the governor objected to the bill-although he
had no authority to veto it-because it gave him too much power over
the judiciary. He wrote:
Convinced as I am that the execution of this power would afford a dangerous precedent,
and that the General Assembly had no Constitutional authority to invest me with it,
and if they had, sensible as I am of the Imperfections of human nature, I dare not
undertake it. I feel myself under the necessity of declining the execution of a power so
repugnant to my principles as a Citizen of a free Republic and so contrary to my Ideas of
the duty I owe the people as their Chief Magistrate.
3 20
Moreover-and this is the critical point-Governor Burke
recognized that judicial review was the ultimate expression of judicial
independence and a necessary expression in any constitutional order
committed to protecting individual rights. He argued against the court
bill in question because "civil liberty would be deprived of its surest
defences against the most dangerous usurpations, that is the
independency of the Judiciary power and its capacity of protecting
Individuals from the operation of Laws unconstitutional and
tyrannical."321
CONCLUSION
The survey of early cases could go on, 322 but suffice it to say
that an examination of a number of the pre-Federal Constitution
precedents for judicial review reveals that, the popular
constitutionalists' assault on the Supreme Court notwithstanding, the
original understanding of judicial review was on all fours with the
traditional understanding: The primary purpose of judicial review is
to protect individual rights from-for want of a better phrase-"the
319. Id. at 863.
320. Id. at 864.
321. Id. at 863. See generally Scott D. Gerber, Unburied Treasure: Governor Thomas Burke
and the Origins of Judicial Review, 8 HISTORICALLY SPEAKING 29 (July/Aug. 2007).
322. For example, in May of 1786 the Inferior Court of Common Pleas for the County of
Rockingham, New Hampshire became the first court in the United States to void as
unconstitutional an act of a coordinate branch of government (and it did so numerous times).
Richard M. Lambert, The 'Ten Pound Act" Cases and the Origins of Judicial Review in New
Hampshire, 43 N.H. B.J. 37, 37 (2002). The court invalidated New Hampshire's Ten Pound Act,
which permitted justices of the peace sitting without juries to decide disputes involving less than
ten pounds, as inconsistent with the constitutional right to trial by jury guaranteed by Article
XX of the New Hampshire Bill of Rights. Id. at 38.
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people themselves." To argue otherwise is to forget why we have a
Constitution in the first place.
323
Of course, popular constitutionalists are not the first group of
scholars to try to situate the Court's role in the American
constitutional order on the basis of the decisions a particular Court
has issued, or might soon be issuing. The best example of how
partisan most constitutional law scholars long have been on the
subject appeared during the Warren Court era, when influential law
professors such as Charles L. Black, Jr. and Eugene V. Rostow argued
that the Court spoke for the people when it exercised judicial review in
Brown v. Board of Education and other cases. 324 These pro-Warren
Court scholars, like the popular constitutionalists of the present day
who are endeavoring to minimize the conservative Court's role in
constitutional interpretation, were on the political left. Clearly, Al
Smith got it right when he quipped in the simpler days of yore that
everything-at least everything in politics-"depends [on] whose ox is
being gored." 3
25
It should not be so, at least with respect to a question as
significant as the Court's place in American life. Laurence H. Tribe,
the most prominent constitutional law scholar of the last several
decades, agrees. Tribe, a political liberal, published a blistering review
of Kramer's The People Themselves that concluded with the following
observation:
In succumbing to the trendy siren song of those who would have the fleeting
"constitutional" sentiments of a temporarily controlling faction bring the court to heel,
Larry Kramer risks playing Pied Piper to a large and potentially impressionable
323. Amazingly, for all of the attention devoted to Federalist No. 78, scholars never seem to
appreciate that this most famous precedent of all for judicial review centers on the protection of
individual rights. Alexander Hamilton wrote:
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited
Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain
specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall
pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind
can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of
justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the
Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges
would amount to nothing.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 86, at 466.
324. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY
(1960); EUGENE V. ROSTOW, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE QUEST
OF LAW (1962). See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
325. HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (8th ed. 2003) (quoting Al Smith). Smith served four terms as




universe of readers and students. Meanwhile, he sadly misses the whole point of Chief
Justice Marshall's great reminder: It is "a constitution we are expounding."
32 6
While I have disagreed with Tribe on questions such as
Clarence Thomas's use of the Declaration of Independence in
constitutional interpretation, 327 the exegesis in the history of ideas
undertaken in the present Article suggests that Tribe is correct about
the most important constitutional law question of all. Put directly,
constitutional law scholars should feel free to disagree all they want
with the Court's decisions in hot buttons cases such as Bush v. Gore,
but they are treading on dangerous ground when they try to suggest
that it is not the Court's place to make those decisions.
With any luck, popular constitutionalism will prove but a
passing fad: law professors have notoriously short attention spans. In
contrast, the contributions of Aristotle, Polybius, Marsilius of Padua,
John Fortescue, Gasparo Contarini, Charles I, Montesquieu, and John
Adams endure. The Court and the Constitution are better for it.
326. Laurence H. Tribe, The People's Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, § 7 (Book Review), at
32 (reviewing KRAMER, supra note 2). For Kramer's response to Tribe's review, see Larry D.
Kramer, Letter to the Editor, Kramer vs. Tribe, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, § 7 (Book Review), at
6. For Tribe's reply to Kramer's response, see Laurence H. Tribe, Letter to the Editor, Kramer
vs. Tribe, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, § 7 (Book Review), at 6.
327. GERBER, supra note 27, at 40-41.
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Democracy and Opportunity: A New
Paradigm in Tax Equity
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This Article suggests that the principal equity goal
underlying a just government is the creation of equal opportunities
for all citizens to achieve self-realization. Therefore, it proposes that
a tax should be designed to achieve equal opportunity for self-
realization as one of its principal goals. Viewing equal opportunity
for self-realization as a design issue leads to the identification of
another principle that is foundational: the promotion of democracy.
Both political philosophy and empirical literature suggest that equal
access to the electoral process and participation in the community
must exist in order for equal opportunity for self-realization to exist.
Designing a tax system to help achieve these goals will not only
increase equity, but also may provide efficiency gains that analysts
have ignored.
To illustrate the importance of designing a tax system based
on these equity principles, this Article revisits the debate about the
desirability of an income tax versus a consumption tax. It argues
that a progressive income tax that limits loss deductions is better
than an ideal consumption tax in establishing the conditions for
equal opportunity for self-realization and democracy. A progressive
income tax that limits loss deductions burdens investment income,
which is a major source of political power. In contrast, a
consumption tax cannot burden the disproportionate political power
of the wealthy because it only burdens investment income in narrow
situations, and wealthy individuals only consume a small
percentage of their total income.
This Article also analyzes other efficiency and equity claims
for the two forms of taxes. The efficiency claims for an ideal
consumption tax versus our existing income tax are overstated when
viewed in the context of real world systems that account for taxpayer
behavior and transition relief. Given the uncertain efficiency gains
of a consumption tax in the real world, there is a strong argument
that the equity goals discussed herein should govern the selection of
a tax system. Such equity goals favor a progressive income tax that
burdens investment income.

